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INTRODUCTION 
“They’ll have to pry that money out of my cold, dead hands before 
I’ll pay it.”1 
Bonnie Jimenez worked as a supply chain director at Otter Products, 
Inc., a company that produces protective cases for electronic devices 
with $168.9 million in annual revenue.2 Jimenez was fired a few 
months after she advised her supervisors that Otter Products should 
accurately report to customs officials the value of its imported 
products.3 Mario Industries, a family-owned lighting business in 
Roanoke, Virginia, had to lay off employees and reduce shifts when it 
lost long-standing contracts to a competitor who was underpricing 
lighting products.4 Mario’s competitor was able to beat market prices 
by buying cheap lighting in China, falsifying the country of origin, and 
avoiding paying import duties.5 GES, a Birmingham, Alabama, family-
owned business that sold graphite rods used in steel production lost 
major customers to a competitor who undercut prices.6 The competitor 
purchased graphite rods made in China and reduced its costs by falsely 
marking products as made in India to avoid paying import taxes.7 
Consumers of prescription drugs such as Xanax® and Valium® 
unknowingly purchased medications that contained entirely different 
ingredients or substandard dosages.8 Importers of these drugs labeled 
them as “gifts” or “toys” to avoid paying import taxes and thereby 
preempted customs inspections of the defective drugs.9 Customers 
throughout the United States bought what they thought was sole, 
 
1 Response by CEO when advised to stop misrepresenting the value of company imports. 
Complaint at 17, United States ex rel. Jimenez v. Otter Products, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-02937-
RM-MJW (D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2011) (Appendix A, #41). 
2 Id. at 3. 
3 Id. at 16–17. 
4 Complaint at 5, United States ex rel. Scutellaro v. Direct Resources, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
00113-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2010) (Appendix A, #25). 
5 Id. at 4, 15. 
6 Complaint at 6, United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v. Ameri-Source 
Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013) (Appendix A, #54) 
[hereinafter Graphite Electrode Sales]. 
7 Id. at 3. 
8 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Indicted in Prescription Drug Smuggling 
Ring (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-indicted-prescription-drug-smug 
gling-ring. 
9 Id. See also Complaint at 30, United States v. Giddens, No. 6:14-cr-00061-MHS-JDL 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2014) (Appendix A, #51). 
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grouper, or flounder but which was, in fact, Vietnamese catfish laced 
with prohibited antibiotics.10 Seafood importers nationwide had 
falsified the country of origin and the type of fish they were importing 
into the United States to circumvent inspections of the fish and avoid 
import taxes.11 These are the victims of trade fraud: the United States 
Treasury that is robbed of millions of dollars in import duties when 
businesses lie about their imported goods, honest businesses that are 
hurt by dishonest competitors, consumers who are exposed to unsafe 
products, employees who are fired for blowing the whistle, and 
industries that are targeted for ruin by companies that are dumping 
products and engaging in predatory pricing. 
Why engage in trade fraud? The simple answer is money. By lying 
about what they are importing, unscrupulous businesses can avoid 
millions of dollars in import taxes owed, reduce their costs, and beat 
competitors’ prices. In today’s global world, where international trade 
permeates every economic exchange, there is tremendous financial 
incentive for dishonest businesses and individuals to lie when they 
import, receive, or sell imported products. They can avoid millions of 
dollars in duties and tariffs and avoid customs inspection of defective 
products. Realistically, there is little chance these modern-day 
smugglers will be caught.12 Countries’ borders are too vast, the volume 
of imports too great, global customs inspections too porous, and law 
enforcement resources too few for effective monitoring or deterrence 
of trade fraud. This Article suggests what can be done to tame this wild, 
new frontier of white-collar crime. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses what trade fraud 
is and how it fits within the political debate on trade. We argue that 
whatever the merits of the free trade-protectionism debate, no one has 
the right to lie about what he or she is bringing into a country. For this 
reason, stopping trade fraud is not a question of politics but of law––
whether unscrupulous should be allowed to take advantage of those 
who follow the rules. Part II addresses the nature of trade fraud and 
discusses how it compares to other white-collar crime and why it is 
 
10 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Individuals Arrested for Conspiracy to 
Import Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007 
/June/07_enrd_413.html. 
11 Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Illinois Resident Pleads Guilty to Illegally 
Dealing in Falsely Labeled Fish From Vietnam (Jan. 14, 2008), https://www.justice.gov 
/archive/opa/pr/2008/January/08_enrd_026.html. 
12 See generally PETER ANDREAS, SMUGGLER NATION: HOW ILLICIT TRADE MADE 
AMERICA (2013) (discussing the history of smuggling and its role in the growth of the 
United States). 
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particularly difficult to detect, prove, and deter. Part III discusses the 
database of cases we have created for this Article. This database 
consists of all criminal and civil trade fraud cases pursued by the U.S. 
Department of Justice from 2000 to 2016. While such a database would 
appear to be readily available, it is not, within the Department of Justice 
or otherwise, because of inconsistencies in reporting and incomplete 
data sets. Thus, our database is the first to compile all trade fraud cases 
in the United States. We discuss the trends revealed in this collection, 
including the growth of criminal prosecutions and the criminal offenses 
used to pursue modern-day smugglers, the increasing reliance on the 
civil False Claims Act (FCA) to combat trade fraud, the types of trade 
fraud pursued, the characteristics of each type of trade fraud, and the 
practical and policy implications of pursuing the various types of trade 
fraud. Part IV concludes with our recommendations on how to enhance 
the fight against trade fraud. 
As the discussion in this Article shows, trade fraud cases are full of 
intrigue. There are “factories” in India allegedly producing 
sophisticated products that are, in reality, old, dilapidated buildings 
incapable of any production.13 There is a spurned lover who brings 
customs officials a hard drive showing millions of dollars of import 
fraud by her boss’s company.14 There are falsified shipping manifests, 
fake shipping labels, and misbranded products. There are ships that 
travel to ports worldwide to conceal the country origin of the products 
they carry.15 
I 
WHAT IS TRADE FRAUD AND WHY SHOULD IT BE PROSECUTED? 
Those who favor free trade policy advance the argument of absolute 
advantage.16 This argument posits that free trade policies advantage 
 
13 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, ¶ 47. 
14 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Companies and CEOs Indicted in School Supply 
Scam (Oct. 22, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/gan/press/2012/10-22-12.html. 
15 Criminal Indictment at 19–20, United States v. Apego, Inc., No. 1:12-cr-00350-SCJ-
AJB (N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2012) (Appendix A, #32). 
16 See generally 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 69 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776). In an argument known as 
“absolute advantage,” renowned economist Adam Smith reasoned that free trade benefits 
both parties because each nation can trade goods it produces at lower costs in exchange for 
the goods it produces at higher costs. Id. at 423 (“If a foreign country can supply us with a 
commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of 
the produce of our own industry employed in a way in which we have some advantage.”). 
PIERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:46 PM 
6 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19, 1 
everyone because each nation can trade goods it produces at lower costs 
in exchange for goods it can produce only at higher costs. Free trade 
proponents also argue that free trade policies allow countries access to 
foreign suppliers who can produce higher quality products than if those 
countries produced such products themselves.17 This leads to the 
exchange of new ideas and technology,18 reduces war,19 and promotes 
individual rights.20 
Those who favor trade protectionist policies argue that protection is 
needed to shield “infant” domestic industries until they mature enough 
to compete internationally.21 They also argue that countries can raise 
 
This specialization or division of labor increases productivity because workers become more 
efficient in their tasks, which results in the rise of a country’s “real revenue and wealth.” Id. 
Classical economist David Ricardo expounds on Smith’s ideas through his theory of 
“comparative advantage,” which states that each country should specialize in producing 
goods for which it has an advantage relative to other countries. See DAVID RICARDO, On 
The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE 
OF DAVID RICARDO 128–49 (Piero Sraffa ed., 2004) (1817) (using England and Portugal as 
an example to explain that global consumption of wine and cloth increases if each country 
specializes in the good for which it has a lower opportunity cost to produce relative to the 
other country). 
17 See SMITH, supra note 16, at 459 (“A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade 
is certainly more likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious and commercial 
nations.”). 
18 Id. at 18. 
19 See, e.g., FREDERICK BASTIAT, ECONOMIC HARMONIES, reprinted in ECONOMIC 
HARMONIES xxxvi (George B. de Huszar ed., W. Hayden Boyers trans., Foundation for 
Economic Education 1968) (1850) (concluding that “[w]e should also have an end to . . . the 
constant threat of war . . . and those entrusted with the responsibility of governing would 
work together for, and not against, the universal harmony. . . .”). See also Richard Cobden, 
On The Effects Of Protection Of The Agricultural Interests of the Country, Speech to British 
House of Commons (Mar. 13, 1845), in CHARLES K. ADAMS, REPRESENTATIVE BRITISH 
ORATIONS 152 (1884) (advocating against the British Corn Laws in his famous speech to 
the House of Commons when the statesmen proclaimed that the free flow of goods “is 
calculated to knit nations more together in the bonds of peace . . . .”). 
20 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Peardon 
ed., 1952) (1690); FREDERICK BASTIAT, PROPERTY AND LAW, reprinted in SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 112 (George B. de Husza  ed., Seymour Cain trans., 
Irvington-on-Hudson 1964) (1848) (stating that to impose government regulations that 
prohibit the exercise of the natural right of free exchange is to “legitimize an act of plunder 
and to violate the law of justice”); SMITH, supra note 16, at 307 (arguing against the 
government’s wasteful, inefficient, and destructive practices, classical liberalism 
economists believe that free trade restores “the natural system of liberty” to pursue their own 
crafts); 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 531–33 (D. Appleton 
and Company 1883) (1848). 
21 First introduced by John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, economists have 
repeatedly revisited the “infant industry” argument since its formulation. See Suhail 
Abboushi, Trade Protectionism, Reasons and Outcomes, 20 COMPETITIVENESS REV. 5, 388 
(2010) (stating that, theoretically, the state lifts the temporary protection until these infant 
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their national income by improving their purchasing power of exports22 
and by protecting domestic workers as they transition to other jobs or 
industries when their positions become obsolete because of trade 
competition.23 Lastly, protectionists argue that a pro-protection trade 
policy allows countries to engage in “strategic trade policy” and “level 
an unequal playing field”24 by subsidizing a domestic company or 
industry so it can better compete in an international market.25 
Trade tariffs are one way in which countries implement their trade 
policies. When businesses import products, they often are required to 
pay import taxes. The type, size, and frequency of such tariffs depend 
 
industries are mature enough to compete with international competitors). See also Anne O. 
Krueger & Baran Tuncer, An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument, 72 AM. ECON. 
REV. 5, 1142–43 (1982); see generally, e.g., Tran Lam Anh Duong, Optimal Infant Industry 
Protection During Transition to World Trade Organization Membership, A Numerical 
Analysis for the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry, 23 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV. 4, 492–
93 (2014) (summarizing briefly the modern empirical and theoretical research sources 
regarding “infant industry” literature). 
22 DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 107–08 (2015) (discussing a country’s 
terms of trade). A country’s terms of trade are “the ratio at which a country exchanges 
exports for imports.” Countries that impose protectionist trade restrictions, such as adjusting 
export or import prices, can potentially increase its purchasing power of exports thereby 
raising its national income. Id. However, a country’s ability to improve its terms of trade 
usually requires the ability to influence international markets. See, e.g., id. at 108 
(exemplifying a country’s terms of trade through oil, diamond, and rare metal industries). 
23 Cletus C. Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal & Geoffrey E. Wood, Protectionist Trade 
Policies, A Survey of Theory, Evidence and Rationale, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS 22 
(JAN./FEB. 1988), reprinted in JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN & DAVID A. LAKE, INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 312 (Routledge 4th 
ed. 2000). According to this theory, when a country’s imports increase from international 
competitors, affected domestic industries pivot by lowering cost and reducing production. 
Id. This adjustment may result in productive resources reallocating to other domestic 
industries, thereby causing workers in specific industries to lose their jobs or relocate. Id. 
24 See id. at 315. Amidst trade deficits and unbalanced reciprocity agreements, 
protectionists claim that governmental measures––even retaliatory ones––may be necessary 
to protect disadvantaged, domestic companies from the threat of an unequal trading field. 
Id. However, the concept of “fair trade,” like many other protectionists’ arguments, remain 
hotly contested by critics––both domestic and abroad. Id. 
25 See IRWIN, supra note 22, at 111. Strategic trade policy is a measure “in which the 
government undertakes a precise, strategic intervention on behalf of domestic firms in a way 
that increases national welfare.” Id. In these situations, governments subsidize exports from 
a domestic company that is competing with an international rival with the intent to siphon 
profits that might otherwise shift to the foreign competitor. See Coughlin, supra note 23, at 
314 (using American economist Paul Krugman’s Boeing and Airbus aircraft manufacturing 
hypothetical to illustrate effect of strategic trade policy). Protectionists argue that, absent 
governmental intervention, a country might lose an opportunity to acquire additional profits 
in the global market. See IRWIN, supra note 22, at 112. 
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on a nation’s stance on free trade versus protectionism.26 Import taxes 
range from a few dollars to millions of dollars depending on the product 
and the volume of imports. Importers self-declare what they are 
importing and its value; taxes are assessed based upon these 
representations. Misrepresentations to minimize or avoid these import 
taxes is fraud. Because the process for assessing and paying import 
taxes is largely voluntary and unchecked, trade fraud is easy to commit 
and hard to detect. Because import taxes can be significant, the 
incentive to engage in such fraud is significant. 
When trade laws are flouted and duties evaded, an array of 
stakeholders are injured. Law-abiding importers who have adjusted 
their business practices by shifting supply chains––generally buying 
their supplies at greater cost or paying import taxes now assessed––are 
injured by the dishonest importers who gain large profit margins by 
offering customers dumping level prices.27 Industries that have made 
business decisions, financial investments, and undertaken contractual 
and debt commitments based on U.S. government commitments in 
trade policies are injured when import laws are not enforced.28 
Consumers who are subject to unsafe products are harmed when greedy 
importers avoid paying import taxes by hiding dangerous information 
about medicine, food, or other products they bring into the country.29 
  
 
26 Countries that engage in free trade policies still may impose import duties. For 
example, the United States signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 1985. See Israel 
Country Commercial Guide, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Israel-Import-Tariffs (last 
updated May 30, 2017). This agreement substantially lowered tariffs between the two 
countries essentially eliminating most tariffs between them. Nevertheless, both countries 
retain tariffs on agricultural goods from the other. See id. 
27 See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 58, United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v. 
Ameri-Source Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013) (Appendix 
A, #54); Complaint at ¶¶ 28-29, United States ex rel. Reade Mfg. Co. v. ESM Group, No. 
1:10-cv-00504-WMS (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010) (Appendix A, #55). 
28 See, e.g., Complaint at 5, United States ex rel. Scutellaro v. Direct Resources, Inc., No. 
1:10-cv-00113-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2010) (Appendix A, #25); Complaint at ¶ 58, United 
States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v. Ameri-Source Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-
00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013) (Appendix A, #54); Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27 
(Appendix A, #55). 
29 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Individuals Arrested for 
Conspiracy to Import Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://www.justice.gov 
/archive/opa/pr/2007/June/07_enrd_413.html (Appendix A, #7); United States v. Wong 
(Appendix A, #7); United States v. Groeb Farms, Inc., No. 1:13-cr-00139 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 
2013) (Appendix A, #33); Giddens, supra note 9 (Appendix A, #51). 
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II 
WHY TRADE FRAUD IS DIFFICULT TO DETECT, PROVE, AND 
DETER 
Trade fraud, like all white-collar crime, is difficult to detect, prove, 
and deter.30 There are $2.71 trillion of imports31 and 32.4 million trade 
entries into the United States each year.32 Imports arrive in the United 
States through 328 ports, 7,000 miles of land borders, and 95,000 miles 
of shoreline.33 Customs Agents inspect only a tiny percentage of these 
imports.34 Even if customs’ inspections were increased exponentially, 
however, they would miss most trade fraud. Modern-day smuggling is 
too diffused and too concealed for detection by visual inspection.35 
Forensic accounting to trace monetary transactions, grants of immunity 
to obtain testimony, analysis of paper trails, piercing of fictitious 
organizations, and dissecting layers of fraudulent transactions are the 
essential investigatory tools. But these tools are expensive, time-
consuming, and resource intensive. Furthermore, they do not even 
guarantee success. Even with such yeoman investigative efforts, most 
trade fraud, like most white-collar crime, is missed by law enforcement. 
 
30 Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. 
REV. 905, 926 (2002) (“With computerization and the Internet, economic wrongdoing has 
entered a different world . . . [it] is easier to commit and harder to stop.”) [hereinafter 
Information as a Commodity]; Pamela H. Bucy, Elizabeth P. Formby, Marc S. Raspanti & 
Kathryn E. Rooney, Why Do They Do It? The Motives, Mores, and Character of White 
Collar Criminals, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 401 (discussing trend noted in study of white collar 
practitioners “that white collar crimes and their investigations have become more 
complex”). 
31 See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. TRADE OVERVIEW 2016, 5, 6 (Apr. 2017), 
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg 
_ian_005537.pdf. 
32 See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, 6, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents 
/2017-Mar/FY-2016-CBP-PAR-508C.pdf (last visited May 31, 2017). 
33 Id. at 8 (last visited May 31, 2017). 
34 See generally U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files 
/assets/documents/2017-Mar/FY-2016-CBP-PAR-508C.pdf (last visited May 31, 2017). 
35 See, e.g., Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Mfg. Co., No. 
3:09-CV-438 (W.D.N.C. May 14, 2010) (Appendix A, #31); Criminal Indictment, United 
States v. Blyth, No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (Jan. 28, 2010) (Appendix A, #19); Bill Singer, 
A Fishy Tale: Defendants Plead Guilty to Seafood Felonies, FORBES (May 5, 2011), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/billsinger/2011/05/05/a-fishy-taledefendants-plead-guilty-to 
-seafood-felonies/#1add4db11e01; United States v. Popa, No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (S.D. 
Ala. Jan. 28, 2010) (Appendix A, #20); Indictment, United States v. Garcia-Adarme, No. 
3:13-cr-00353-FAB (D.P.R. June 20, 2013) (Appendix A, #36). 
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While all white-collar crime is difficult to detect,36 trade fraud is harder. 
Smugglers’ success is limited only by human ingenuity. Trade fraud is 
hidden in layers of organizations, concealed in byzantine electronic 
communications, and obscured by money laundering. The simplest 
exchange spans the globe; the smallest shipment involves international 
monetary transactions. Successful detection of trade fraud is hampered 
by the varying honesty, competence, and resources of nations’ customs 
regulators. 
III 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATABASE: TRADE FRAUD CASES FROM 2000 
TO 2016 
To examine trade fraud, we sought to collect all prosecutions of 
import trade fraud, criminal and civil, brought by the U.S. Department 
of Justice between 2000 and 2016. Section A describes our search 
methodology and overall findings. Section B discusses the trends 
shown in these cases, including the increase in criminal prosecutions, 
the growing reliance on the FCA, the types of trade fraud pursued, the 
characteristics of each type of trade fraud, and the practical and policy 
implications of pursing the various types of trade fraud. 
A. Data Collection Methodology and Overview of Findings 
Using multiple search terms37 in various databases,38 we searched 
for trade fraud cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice between 
 
36 Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940–41 (discussing how “the complex 
nature of economic crime and the diffuse nature of the business environment” make it 
difficult for regulators to detect white collar crime in time to prevent it). 
37 We used the following terms, individually and in combination: “trade fraud;” “Trade 
Agreements Act;” “antidumping;” “countervailing duties;” “CVD;” and “False Claims 
Act.” 
38 We first ran a Google search of the current and archived Department of Justice press 
release collections (located at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ and https://www.justice.gov 
/archive/opa/pr/ respectively). The results of these searches were manually inspected, and 
those that were on-topic were noted and copied. 
 After the initial search, we found that there were press releases held on Department of 
Justice (DOJ) servers that were not included in the main archive, primarily in individual 
pages for United States Attorney offices. To find these we ran an expanded search of the 
entire DOJ domain (https://www.justice.gov), using search terms similar to the press release 
archive, with additional terms such as “for immediate release” that would denote a press 
release. To be as exhaustive as possible, we expanded the previous search to the entire .gov 
domain. 
 We then searched federal district court dockets via Bloomberg Law for the complaints of 
all cases we found in the press release search. We also initiated a keyword and cause of 
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2000 and 2016. We confined our collection to import fraud cases 
because there are no duties or tariffs associated with export fraud.39 
Using this combined search methodology, we found forty-seven trade 
fraud cases40 involving hundreds of defendants that have been brought 
by the U.S. Department of Justice between 2000 and 2016. The 
defendants include individuals, “mom and pop” businesses, and large 
conglomerates. Appendix A catalogs these cases by name, description 
of facts, type of fraud, and status or outcome. 
Several trends are apparent from this collection of cases. In the 
sixteen years between 2000 and 2016, court activity in import trade 
fraud cases increased nine-fold with a major spike beginning in 2012, 
which peaked in 2014. As Chart 1 below demonstrates, both criminal 
prosecutions and civil FCA cases increased during this sixteen-year 
period. During this same time period, forty-two percent of trade fraud 
cases have been criminal prosecutions and fifty-eight percent have been 
brought under the civil FCA. The criminal prosecutions include 
charges of smuggling, and smuggling-related offenses, such as receipt 
of smuggled goods,41 misbranding,42 and prohibited trade in wildlife, 
 
action search for False Claims Act and trade, antidumping, or countervailing duties. Due to 
the limitations of PACER, where these documents are sourced, we were only able to search 
the user keyed metadata, and not the actual content of the filings. 
 Lastly, we conducted a Westlaw case search in all federal district courts, using the same 
key words. 
39 We did not include cases that were dismissed. So, for example, we did not include the 
complaint filed by a relator that included trade fraud allegations when the settlement did not 
include trade fraud and the relator’s claims were dismissed. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Sandager v. Dell Marketing L.P., 872 F. Supp. 2d 801 (D. Minn. 2012). See also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Company Agrees to Pay $32.5 million for 
Alleged Overbilling of the U.S. Postal Service (Aug. 1, 2014). Nor did we include cases in 
which the United States did not intervene and where the courts dismissed the action on other 
grounds such as statute of limitations or whether there was fraud. See United States ex rel. 
Thornton G. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (The court 
held that the relator’s claim barred by the FCA’s six-year statute of limitations; FCA’s 
statute of limitations extends beyond six years only when the United States is a party, not in 
relator actions in which the United States has not intervened; the defendants’ alleged false 
statement about product (whether components were permanently installed at the time of 
importation) was immaterial; there was no customs fraud because the product (bus shells) 
qualified for duty-free treatment.). 
40 As can be seen in Appendix A, we have included fifty-seven entries in our catalog of 
trade fraud cases. We found it helpful in some cases to list multiple stages of some cases, 
but the total number of cases is forty-seven. 
41 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 541–54 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
42 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 331(a), 352(a) & (f), 333(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. 115-140). 
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fish, and plants.43 Criminal prosecutions also include generic white-
collar offenses such as wire fraud,44 conspiracy,45 money laundering,46 
and obstruction of justice.47 Sentences levied after conviction tend to 
be minimal: probation is common. When incarceration is imposed, 
sentences generally range from one-to-three years. 
Restitution in significant amounts has been ordered in some criminal 
cases ($12 million,48 $7.16 million,49 $6.246 million,50 $3 million,51 
$1.017 million52). Forfeiture of assets, also in significant amounts, has 
been imposed upon conviction ($12 million,53 $400,000,54 $197,93055). 
As with other white-collar frauds, parallel criminal prosecutions and 
 
43 The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–77 (Lexis through Pub. L. 115-140). 
44 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
45 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
46 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
47 18 U.S.C.S. § 1505 (Lexis through Pub. L. 115-140). 
48 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, President of Company that Illegally Imported 
Catfish Sentenced to More Than Five Years in Federal Prison (May 19, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/president-company-illegally-imported-catfish-sentenced       
-more-five-years-federal-prison. 
49 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cigarette Importer Agrees to Pay U.S. $3.1 
Million as Part of $10.6 Million Settlement with Justice Department (Dec. 4, 2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07_civ_966.html (discussing 
United States v. Premier Manufacturing Inc., No. 2:05-cr-00344-DCN (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 
2005) (Appendix A, #8)). 
50 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Father and Son Sentenced for Defrauding the 
United States (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/father-and-son-sen 
tenced-defrauding-united-states (discussing United States v. Magness, No. 1:10-cr-00125-
WMS-JJM (Sept. 8, 2015) (Appendix A, #50)). 
51 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Caviar Distributor Pleads Guilty to 
Multi-Million Dollar Customs Fraud Scheme (Nov. 29, 2012), https://www.ice.gov 
/news/releases/caviar-distributor-pleads-guilty-multi-million-dollar-customs-fraud-
scheme. See also Appendix A, #30. 
52 Complaint at 2, United States v. Fai Po Jewellery, No. 3:12-cr-00068-SLG (D.C. Ak. 
Aug. 8, 2012) (Appendix A, #28). 
53 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Found Guilty of Conspiracy Involving the 
Importation and Sale of Falsely Labeled Fish from Vietnam (Oct. 30, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-enrd-967.html (discussing United 
States v. Lam (Appendix A, #12)). 
54 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Online Clothing Business Owners Sentenced for 
Customs Fraud, Money Laundering (May 5, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca 
/pr/online-clothing-business-owners-sentenced-customs-fraud-money-laundering 
(discussing United States v. Nguyen, No. 1:13-cr-000360LIO-SKO (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 
2013) (Appendix A, #42)). 
55 Indictment at 1, United States v. True World Foods Chicago, LLC, No. 2:07-cr-01271 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2007) (Appendix A, #10). 
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civil suits under the civil FCA have been brought in a number of trade 
fraud cases.56 
All civil trade cases have been brought under the civil FCA. 
Resolution in FCA cases include some significant settlements: $45 
million,57 $27.95 million,58 and several settlements of $15 million.59 
Awards to relators include $7.875 million,60 $3.335 million,61 $2.4 
million,62 $2.25 million,63 $2.1 million,64 $1.5 million,65 and $1.2 
million.66 
  
 
56 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, United States ex rel. Ludlow v. CMAI Indus., LLC, No. 2:09-
cv-14860 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (Appendix A, #26). See also Magness, supra note 50; Reade 
Mfg. Co., supra note 27 (Magness was prosecuted for the same activity at issue in the civil 
FCA case, Reade Mfg. Co.). 
57 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Japanese-Based Toyo Ink and Affiliates in New 
Jersey and Illinois Settle False Claims Allegations for $45 Million (Dec. 17, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/japanese-based-toyo-ink-and-affiliates-new-jersey-and-illi 
nois-settle-false-claims-allegation. 
58 United States ex rel. Safina Office Products v. Office Depot, No. 1:03-cv-00003-RMC 
(D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2003) (Appendix A, #2, 3, 4, 5). See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Defendant Office Max Settles Case for $9.8 million (May 19, 2005); Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Defendant Office Depot Settles Case for $4.75 Million (Sept. 19, 2005); 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defendant Staples Settles Case for $7.4 Million (Oct. 
18, 2005); and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defendant Corporate Express Settles 
Case for $5.02 Million (Feb. 10, 2006). 
59 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Texas-Based Importers Agree to Pay $15 Million 
to Settle False Claims Act Suit for Alleged Evasion of Customs Duties (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-based-importers-agree-pay-15-million-settle-false       
-claims-act-suit-alleged-evasion [hereinafter Univ. Lofts] (Appendix A, #52); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California-Based Z Gallerie LLC Agrees to Pay $15 Million 
to Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Apr. 26, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-based-z-gallerie-llc-agrees-pay-15-million-settle 
-false-claims-act-suit-alleging [hereinafter Wells] (Appendix A, #56). 
60 Dickson, supra note 35. 
61 Safina Office Products, supra note 58. 
62 Wells, supra note 59. 
63 Univ. Lofts, supra note 59. 
64 Alex Lawson, Whistleblower Awarded $2M in Apparel Duty Evasion Suit, LAW 360 
(May 2, 2014, 11:30 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/533498/whistleblower-award 
ed-2m-in-apparel-duty-evasion-suit. See also United States ex rel. Krigstein v. Siouni & Zar 
Corp., No. 1:11-cv-04247-CM (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013) (Appendix A, #40). 
65 False Claims Complaint, United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW-Government, Inc., No. 
3:05-cv-00033-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2005) (Appendix A, #34). 
66 Ludlow, supra note 56. 
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Chart 1. Trade fraud cases−criminal and civil by year 
 
All import trade fraud cases, criminal or civil, fall into two types of 
fraud: (1) misrepresentations regarding the nature of the goods 
imported, and (2) misrepresentations regarding the origin of goods. 
Importers falsify the country of origin for two reasons: to avoid 
antidumping or countervailing import duties, and/or to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. Chart 2 below summarizes the trends 
in types of trade fraud. 
Chart 2. Trade fraud cases−type of fraud by year 
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B. Discussion of Cases 
“Commercial smuggling schemes not only rob the government of 
vital revenues, they also undermine the economy and penalize 
businesses that follow the rules.”67 
1. Misrepresentations Regarding the Nature of Products Imported 
Import duties are imposed based upon what is being imported, and 
sometimes, on the value or quantity of goods. To avoid or reduce the 
duties they would otherwise owe, unscrupulous importers falsify what 
they are importing or understate the weight68 or value69 of their 
imports.70 They falsify the travel route of goods to make them appear 
to be shipped “through” the United States rather than as “entering” U.S. 
commerce.71 They falsely declare imported goods to be “samples” 
rather than goods for sale,72 misrepresent how goods are made,73 and 
falsely describe ingredients in imports, including prescription drugs,74 
magnesium powder used in anti-aircraft flares,75 and computer 
networking equipment.76 
 
67 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Online Clothing Business Owners Sentenced for 
Customs Fraud, Money Laundering (May 5, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr 
/online-clothing-business-owners-sentenced-customs-fraud-money-laundering (statement 
of Mike Prado, U.S. Homeland Security Investigation discussing U.S. v. Nguyen). 
68 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cigarette Importer Agrees to Pay U.S. $3.1 
Million as Part of $10.6 Million Settlement with Justice Department (Dec. 4, 2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07_civ_966.html (discussing 
United States v. Premier Manufacturing Inc. No. 2:05-cr-00344-DCN (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 
2005) (Appendix A, #8)). 
69 Fai Po Jewellery, supra note 52; Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 16, United States ex 
rel. Karlin v. Noble Jewelry Holdings Ltd., No. 1:08-cv-07826-JGK-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
29, 2011) (Appendix A, #23). 
70 Krigstein, supra note 64; Wong, supra note 29. 
71 Complaint, United States v. Chavez, No. 3:12-cr-03137-MMA (S.D. Cal. July 23, 
2012) (Appendix A, #29). 
72 Nguyen, supra note 54. 
73 An “assist” is “materials or components in the imported merchandise supplied directly 
to indirectly by the buyer of such merchandise without adequate compensation, for use 
related to the production on sale for export to the U.S.” Jimenez, supra note 1. 
74 Giddens, supra note 9. 
75 Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27. 
76 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Maryland Man Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison 
for Importing and Selling Counterfeit Cisco Computer Networking Equipment (Aug. 18, 
2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2012/03/15/cone 
Sent.pdf (discussing United States v. Cone, No. 11-4888 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2010), rev’d, 
No. 11-4934 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2013) (Appendix A, #22)). 
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A criminal prosecution of individuals in Texas exemplifies this type 
of fraud. In United States v. Giddens,77 defendants falsely claimed they 
were importing “gifts” or “toys” when in fact they were importing 
medications such as Xanax®, Valium®, Cialis®, Viagra®, and Still 
NOx®.78 The defendants not only avoided import duties by concealing 
the true nature of their goods, but also preempted any possible 
inspections by customs officials of the medications––which were in 
fact defective. According to the law enforcement officials, “None of 
the pills . . . were legitimate. Some were sub-potent, but most contained 
entirely different active ingredients than the legitimate, approved 
versions.”79 
United States v. Cone provides another example of 
misrepresentation of an import’s nature.80 Defendants in Virginia were 
convicted at the conclusion of a twelve-day jury trial for 
misrepresenting the nature of their imports, computer equipment, to 
avoid or minimize import duties.81 Operating “a large-scale counterfeit 
computer networking business” in China, defendants “altered Cisco 
products” and used pirated software.82 To conceal their fraud and avoid 
import duties, they mislabeled their imported products and packaging, 
used false names and addresses on importation documents, and “hid 
millions of dollars of counterfeit proceeds through a web of bank 
accounts and real estate held in the . . . names of family members in 
China.”83 The jury’s verdict included forfeiture of assets “including two 
Porsches, one Mercedes, seven bank accounts containing more than 
$41.6 million, as well as four homes and three condominiums with a 
total value of more than $2.6 million.”84 
The prosecution of a customs broker in California demonstrates the 
type of convoluted schemes defendants undertake to conceal the true 
nature of their imports. Gerardo Chavez was hired by wholesalers of 
goods to manage the importation of their goods into the port at Long 
Beach, California, including payment of import duties.85 When the 
 
77 Giddens, supra note 9. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Cone, supra note 76. 
81 Nathan M. Peak, $2 Million FCA Settlement, ASHCRAFT & GEREL, http://ashcraft 
andgerel.com/news/2-million-fca-settlement (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Chavez, supra note 71. 
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goods arrived in Long Beach, truck drivers hired by Chavez transported 
the goods to warehouses in southern California where false paperwork 
and data entries were created to reflect that the goods were not entering 
U.S. commerce but were being transshipped to other countries, such as 
Mexico.86 The goods were then shipped to destinations throughout the 
United States.87 This scheme avoided millions of dollars in import 
taxes, which Chavez had already collected from the wholesalers.88 
Chavez and his conspirators pocketed the import duties paid by his 
clients, thus cheating them as well as the U.S. Treasury.89 In addition, 
because Chavez and his conspirators “had now effectively imported the 
goods tax-free, they could, in turn, sell more merchandise at cheaper 
prices––and reap greater profits––than their law-abiding competitors, 
including American manufactures of the same goods.”90 This scheme 
led to the importation of more than $100 million in foreign goods and 
caused a loss of more than $18 million in U.S. taxes.91 
2. Misrepresentations Regarding Country of Origin to Avoid Import 
Duties 
Some import duties are imposed only on designated products from 
certain countries.92 Most common among these country and product 
specific duties are antidumping and countervailing duties.93 Of all 
tariffs assessed in today’s global market, antidumping and 
countervailing duties have become the most prevalent, at least in the 
United States.94 These duties are also the most controversial. 
  
 
86 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Attorney, President of San Diego Customs Brokers 
Association Pleads Guilty to Overseeing $100 Million Customs Fraud (Nov. 15, 2012). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Safina Office Products, supra note 58; United States ex rel. Schweizer v. 
OCE N.V., No. 1:06-cv-00648-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2006) (Appendix A, #6); United States 
v. Intertex Apparel Groups, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-05313-NRB (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008) 
(Appendix A, #11). 
93 See Enforcement and Compliance: Antidumping and Countervailing Investigations 
Initiated After January 1, 2000, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://enforcement.trade.gov/stats 
/inv-initiations-2000-current.html (last updated Aug. 17, 2016) (listing the total AD/CVD 
investigations opened and which of those resulted in duties). 
94 Id. 
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a. What are Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and Why Have 
Them? 
Antidumping duties (“AD”) are designed to “protect against foreign 
companies ‘dumping’ products on U.S. markets at prices below cost.”95 
ADs are assessed when businesses from non-market countries sell a 
product in the United States at a price lower than the price for which 
the product is sold in the country of origin––i.e., the country of origin 
(“normal value”)96 and as a result, an industry in the United States is 
“materially injured, threatened with material injury,” or the 
establishment of an industry is “materially retarded.”97 The duty 
assessed is the “dumping” margin which is the “amount by which the 
normal value exceeds the export price.”98 Antidumping duties currently 
assessed by the United States include, for example, 305% on Chinese 
imports of pure magnesium, 329% on Chinese saccharin, and 429% on 
Chinese drill pipe.99 
Countervailing duties (“CVD”) are assessed to “offset foreign 
government subsidies.”100 Subsidies are especially common in non-
market economies where the government owns certain industries or 
pumps considerable public and governmental resources into an 
industry.101 CVDs are assessed on the products that benefit from such 
 
95 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Importers to Pay Over $3 Million to Settle 
False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-importers-pay-over-3-million-settle-false-claims-act  
-suit-alleging-evaded-customs. 
96 Id. 
97 In antidumping cases, the United States will impose duties if (1) Commerce determines 
that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United 
States at less than its fair value and (2) the Commission determines that an industry in the 
United States is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment 
of an industry in the United States is materially retarded by reason of imports of that 
merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for 
importation. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
98 19 U.S.C.S. § 1677(35) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
99 See 66 Fed. Reg. 57936 (Nov. 19, 2001); 68 Fed. Reg. 40906 (July 9, 2003); 76 Fed. 
Reg. 11757 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
100 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Ohio-Based Basco Manufacturing Co. to Pay 
$1.1 Million for Allegedly Falsifying Customs Documents to Evade Import Duties on 
Chinese Products (Nov. 14. 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-based-basco-manu 
facturing-co-pay-11-million-allegedly-falsifying-customs-documents-evade (Complaint at 
¶¶ 30–34, United States ex rel. Valenti v. Tai Shan Golden Gain Aluminum Products, Ltd., 
No. 11-cv-368 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2013) (Appendix A, #37)). 
101 See Appendices B-4 and B-5 noting number of countervailing duty orders on Chinese 
products––a non-market economy. For a fuller discussion, see Special Report: The World 
Economy, THE ECONOMIST 5–16 (Oct. 1, 2016).  
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subsidies. Sample CVDs imposed by the United States include 206% 
of value on Chinese ammonium sulfate; 210% on Chinese carbon and 
steel alloy plates, and 235% on Chinese corrosion-resistant steel 
products.102 
The major products on which AD and CVD are imposed are iron and 
steel, followed by chemicals, and plastic/rubber/stone/glass.103 Goods 
from China, India, and Korea are the subject of most AD and CVD 
duties currently imposed.104 Worldwide, the number of ADs and CVDs 
have increased in the past two years following steady increases 
beginning in 2011.105 Not surprisingly, the uptick in the imposition of 
ADs and CVDs by the U.S. coincides with a surge in trade fraud 
prosecutions by the United States.106 Since 2000, there have been 
multiple cycles in the number of ADs and CVDs imposed, with dips in 
the global number of ADs and CVDs in 2007 and 2011, and peaks in 
2008 and 2016.107 Currently, Brazil, India, the EU, the United States, 
and China impose the greatest number of ADs; Russia, Indonesia, and 
South Korea impose the fewest.108 The United States imposes the 
highest number of countervailing duties of any other country.109 The 
United States imposes four and a half times more CVDs than the next 
highest imposing country, and more than all other countries 
 
102 See 81 Fed. Reg. 76332 (Nov. 2, 2016); 81 Fed. Reg. 62871 (Sept. 13, 2016); 80 Fed. 
Reg. 68843 (Nov. 6, 2015). In countervailing duty cases, the United States will impose 
duties if it determines that (1) the government of a country or any public entity within the 
territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with 
respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, 
or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States, and (2) in cases of 
merchandise imported from a Subsidies Agreement country, the Commission determines 
that an industry in the United States is materially injured, or is threatened with material 
injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by 
reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of 
that merchandise for importation. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1671 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
103 Appendix B-1. 
104 Appendix B-5. 
105 Appendix B-6. 
106 See supra Chart 1. 
107 Appendix B-6. 
108 Appendix B-2. 
109 The United States imposed 9 CVDs in 2015 (and 216 from 1981 to 2015), compared 
to China (which imposed none in 2015, and 6 from 2010 to 2014), Brazil (none in 2015 and 
10 from 2001 to 2015) and Canada (2 in 2015 and 33 from 1985 to 2015). Appendix B-5. 
Note that data maintained on the number of CVDs is not maintained in congruent time spans. 
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combined.110 While the total number of ADs and CVDs imposed 
worldwide is small, they account for millions of dollars. 
As noted, antidumping and countervailing duties are imposed after 
findings of “dumping” (ADs) or “subsidization” of products (CVDs). 
Additionally, before antidumping or countervailing duties are imposed, 
there must be a finding that importation of products materially impacts, 
retards, or weakens American industries.111 All findings are made in an 
administrative process that involves two federal agencies, with 
multiple hearings and appeals.112 All parties are given the opportunity 
to be heard, present evidence, and seek appeals. This litigation process 
is lengthy and requires investment of time, money, and resources by 
the parties. For this reason and because of the harm to law-abiding 
businesses that result from trade fraud113 we argue that whatever one’s 
views on the free trade versus protectionism debate, it is compelling 
public policy to aggressively pursue trade fraud. The parties that have 
invested in this administrative process are entitled to rely on the 
findings and orders that result from this process. They have made 
business decisions based upon the outcome of this administrative 
process. Their reliance on the rule of law inherent in these 
administrative proceedings is justified. 
The first step in the administrative process leading to possible 
imposition of import duties is a petition filed with the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (DoC) and the International Trade Court (ITC) by the 
party seeking imposition of the duties.114 The petitioner must show that 
it is a “qualified party,”115 and that “an industry in the U.S. is materially 
 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., Michael O. Moore & Mark Wu, Antidumping and Strategic Industrial 
Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China-X Ray Equipment Dispute, 14 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 239, 239–86 (2015); Thomas A. Hemphill & George O. White III, China’s 
National Champions: The Evolution of a National Industrial Policy−Or a New Era of 
Economic Protectionism, 55 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 194, 202 (2013). 
112 This process does not determine whether products are imported with the intent, by a 
nation or a company, as part of an economic policy, to target, weaken, impede or destroy a 
particular industry. Rather, the assumption of such intent is presumed from the fact that 
products are being sold at below value cost (antidumping duties) or are subsidized by a 
country (countervailing duties) and the sale of such products “materially injured, threatened 
with material injury” or the establishment of an industry is “materially retarded.” 19 
U.S.C.S. § 1673 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 2−10; infra text accompanying notes 130–94. 
114 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY 
HANDBOOK I-3 (June 2015), https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/handbook 
.pdf; 19 U.S.C.S. § 1671a (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
115 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1677(9)(C)–(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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injured or threatened with material injury or that the establishment of 
an industry is materially retarded” by reason of the antidumping or 
subsidy activity.116 There must be an affirmative preliminary 
determination on the petition by the DoC117 before the matter may 
proceed to the ITC for investigation.118 If the ITC’s determination is 
affirmative following its investigation, the ITC relays its facts and 
conclusions back to the DoC119 which then determines whether there is 
a “reasonable basis” to believe or suspect that “dumped” merchandise 
is being sold for less than the fair value or that a countervailing subsidy 
is being provided for the merchandise at issue.120 If the DoC finds in 
 
116 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 702(b), 732(b), 1677(9) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The 
petition must be accompanied by “information reasonably available to the petitioner 
supporting those allegations.” 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671a(b)(1), 1673a(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. 
L. No. 115-140). The petition must also comply with several other rules which govern: (1) 
the contents of a petition, (2) filing requirements, (3) notification of foreign governments, 
(4) pre-initiation communications with the Secretary, and (5) assistance to small businesses 
in preparing petitions. 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.202(b)–(h) (2016). The Commission also refers 
interested parties to the additional regulations located under 19 C.F.R. § 351.202 regarding 
the contents of their petitions. 19 C.F.R. § 351.202(a). 
117 DoC determines whether the petition (1) has been filed by or on behalf of the industry 
interested party’s petition, (2) sufficiently alleges the necessary elements, and (3) provides 
the information reasonably available to petitioner supporting the allegations. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 
1671a(c)(1)(a), 1673a(c)(1)(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The DoC has twenty 
days to respond from the filing of the petition, but may delay its initial determination up to 
additional twenty days in cases involving “exceptional circumstances” to “poll or otherwise 
determine support for the petition by the industry.” 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671a(c)(1)(b), 
1673a(c)(1)(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). If the DoC’s determination is negative, 
the agency closes its investigation and the proceedings conclude. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 
1671b(a)(1)(B), 1673b(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
118 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(2), 1673a(c)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). In the 
preliminary phase of the Commission’s investigation, the body has forty-five days after the 
date on which the petition is filed to determine, based on the information available, whether 
there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is materially injured, or 
is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is 
materially retarded, by reason of imports of the merchandise and that the imports of the 
subject merchandise are not negligible. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(a)(1), 1673b(a)(1) (Lexis 
through Pub. L. No. 115-140). This preliminary phase of investigation includes several 
additional stages of investigation. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 114, at II-5 
(“The preliminary phase of the Commission’s investigation may be broken down into six 
stages: (1) institution of the investigation and scheduling of the preliminary phase, (2) 
questionnaires, (3) staff conference and briefs, (4) staff report and memoranda, (5) briefing 
and vote, and (6) determination and views of the Commission.”). If the DoC’s determination 
is negative, the agency terminates the proceedings. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671(a), 1671b(a), 
1673b(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
119 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(f), 1673b(f) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
120 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(b), 1673b(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). In 
countervailing duty investigations, if DoC concludes there is a reasonable basis for its 
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the affirmative, the ITC makes its final determination on material 
injury, threatened material injury, or material retardation.121 If the ITC 
finds such harm, the DoC engages in a lengthy122 fact-finding process 
that includes submission of questionnaires, reports, comments, and 
briefs by the parties.123 At the conclusion of the fact finding process, 
 
decision, the agency estimates a subsidy rate for each firm or country investigated. 19 
U.S.C.S. § 1671b(d)(1)(A)(i) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). This determination is 
made within sixty-five days after DoC initiates an investigation. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1671b(b)(1) 
(Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). But in extraordinarily complicated cases, or by request 
of the petitioner, DoC’s determination can be made within 130 days. 19 U.S.C.S. § 
1671b(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). In antidumping investigations, if 
DoC concludes there is a reasonable basis for its decision, the agency estimates the 
weighted-average dumping margin and an estimated all-others rate for all exporters and 
producers not individually investigated. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673b(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (Lexis through 
Pub. L. No. 115-140). This determination is made 140 days––or 190 days in extraordinarily 
complicated cases or by request of the petitioner––after DoC initiates its investigation. 19 
U.S.C.S. §§ 1673b(b)(1)(A), 1673b(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
 If DoC’s preliminary determination is affirmative, the agency orders (1) the posting of a 
cash deposit, bond, or other security for each entry of the subject merchandise in an amount 
based on the estimated weighted average dumping margin or the estimated all-others rate 
and (2) the suspension of liquidation of all entries of merchandise which are entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which notice of the 
determination is published in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(d)(1)–(2), 
1673b(d)(1)–(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
121 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The 
Commission completes its investigation either before the 120th day after DoC makes its 
affirmative preliminary determination, or the 45th day after DoC makes its affirmative final 
determination, whichever is later. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(b)(2), 1673d(b)(2) (Lexis through 
Pub. L. No. 115-140). This last stage consists of several phases before the Commission 
publishes its final determination and views. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 
114, at II-15 (“The final phase of the Commission’s investigation may be broken down into 
eight stages: (1) scheduling of the final phase, (2) questionnaires, (3) prehearing staff report, 
(4) hearing and briefs, (5) final staff report and memoranda, (6) closing of the record and 
final comments by parties, (7) briefing and vote and (8) determination and views of the 
Commission.”). Once the Commission makes its final determination, it issues a public 
notification of its findings and the determination is published in the Federal Register. 19 
U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(d), 1673d(d) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
122 The Commission completes its investigation either before the 120th day after DoC 
makes its affirmative preliminary determination, or the 45th day after DoC makes its 
affirmative final determination, whichever is later. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(b)(2), 1673d(b)(2) 
(Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
123 If DoC’s preliminary determination is affirmative, the agency orders (1) the posting 
of a cash deposit, bond, or other security for each entry of the subject merchandise in an 
amount based on the estimated weighted average dumping margin or the estimated all-others 
rate and (2) the suspension of liquidation of all entries of merchandise which are entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which notice of the 
determination is published in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(d)(1)–(2), 
1673b(d)(1)–(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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the DoC makes a final determination of injury and issues a public 
notice of its findings.124 
b. The Rationale Behind Antidumping and Countervailing Duties 
The following hypothetical demonstrates the rationale for imposing 
ADs and CVDs. Assume Businesses A and B manufacture widgets. 
Business A embarks on a plan to capture the market. Business A prices 
its widgets below its production cost, increases production, and floods 
the market with a low-cost alternative to Business B’s higher-priced 
product. Business A succeeds in driving Business B out of business. 
In a market economy, if Business A chooses to assume the risks of 
its plan to force out its competitor, it may do so as long as it follows all 
applicable laws. Business A’s aggressive plan is permissible because 
Businesses A and B are subject to the same laws and the same capital, 
tax, and other regulatory requirements. Neither business receives help 
from the government, such as subsidies, that is not available to the 
other. Businesses A and B are competing on a level playing field. 
Business A’s activity is not fair, however, if the government subsidizes 
Business A but not Business B, or provides advantages to Business A 
that it does not provide to Business B, thus unfairly altering the market 
conditions. 
Antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) seek to 
address situations when the players are not subject to the same market 
conditions. As proponents of such duties argue, imposition of AD or 
CVD duties provide protection when: 
[T]he goal of foreign manufacturers that sell goods at an artificially 
low price, for example, below cost . . . is to charge such prices long 
enough to put out of business competitors lacking the capacity to 
absorb the costs of matching the artificially low price for any length 
of time.125 
 
124 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). This last 
stage consists of several phases before the Commission publishes its final determination and 
views. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 114, at II-15 (“The final phase of the 
Commission’s investigation may be broken down into eight stages: (1) scheduling of the 
final phase, (2) questionnaires, (3) prehearing staff report, (4) hearing and briefs, (5) final 
staff report and memoranda, (6) closing of the record and final comments by parties, (7) 
briefing and vote and (8) determination and views of the Commission.”). Once the 
Commission makes its final determination, it issues a public notification of its findings and 
the determination is published in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(d), 1673d(d) 
(Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
125 Dickson, supra note 35. 
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The harm from unfair market conditions is shown in the above 
hypothetical, if Business A receives government support when 
Business B does not. The above hypothetical also demonstrates the 
potential harm to consumers who pay higher prices for lesser quality 
widgets and receive worse customer service when Business A gains 
control of the market. Law enforcement officials describe the harm that 
can result to consumers from “dumping” activity by subsidized 
economies: “By eliminating competition, foreign firms subsidized by 
foreign governments, are then free to raise prices to anti-competitive 
levels and recover the temporary cost of the dumping scheme.”126 In 
the above example, consumers who need widgets are harmed when 
Business A, now with a subsidized monopoly, raises prices, cuts 
quality, and reduces customer service. 
c. Criminal Prosecution of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties 
As noted in Section A above,127 violations of antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws may lead to criminal prosecution. This is aptly 
demonstrated in multiple prosecutions of importers of Vietnamese 
catfish who falsified the country of origin  to avoid antidumping duties 
and to help hide prohibited chemicals in their fish. 
Catfish farmers throughout the United States had previously 
petitioned and obtained antidumping duties from the DoC on imports 
of catfish from Vietnam after showing that catfish was being dumped 
by Vietnamese companies in the U.S. market at prices less than the fish 
were sold in Vietnam (with currency adjustments).128 Thereafter, a 
number of seafood companies in the United States continued to import 
Vietnamese catfish but falsely listed their imports as sole, grouper, and 
flounder to avoid paying the now applicable antidumping duties on 
 
126 Id. As law enforcement officials explain: “Countervailing and antidumping duties are 
designed to provide a level playing field between companies that purchase products 
domestically and those that import products from countries that subsidize their production . 
. . . Importers who use fraud to avoid paying these duties gain an unfair business advantage 
over competitors who abide by the rules.” Id. 
127 Dickson, supra note 35. 
128 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Individuals Arrested for 
Conspiracy to Import Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://www.justice.gov 
/archive/opa/pr/2007/June/07_enrd_413.html (United States v. Wong, Appendix A, #7); 
True World Foods, supra note 55; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Found Guilty 
of Conspiracy Involving the Importation and Sale of Falsely Labeled Fish from Vietnam 
(Oct. 30, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-enrd-967.html 
(United States v. Lam, Yavelberg, Appendix A, #12). 
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catfish.129 Some of these catfish also posed a health hazard, testing 
positive for malachite green, a chemical compound used in overseas 
fish farming, and Enrofloxin, an antibiotic banned by the FDA.130 Both 
malachite green and Enrofloxin are banned from use in food in the 
United States.131 The defendants were convicted of Lacey Act 
offenses.132 
In a similar case, a honey broker in Texas was prosecuted for falsely 
stating that Vietnamese honey was from Malaysia and India to avoid 
$37.9 million in antidumping duties.133 This honey contained 
Chloramphenicol, another antibiotic banned in the United States in 
food products.134 
d. Use of the Civil False Claims Act to Pursue Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Violations 
There are more civil suits aimed at antidumping and countervailing 
duty fraud brought under the FCA than criminal prosecutions for this 
activity.135 The case of United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales 
(GES) v. Ameri-Source,136 demonstrates use of the FCA to combat 
antidumping violations. This case also demonstrates how private 
parties can initiate FCA cases and work hand-in-hand with the U.S. 
Department of Justice in pursuing them.137 GES, a multi-generational, 
family-owned company, imports and sells graphite electrodes which 
are used to heat molten scrap metal in steel production.138 For years, 
GES imported graphite electrodes from a variety of foreign sources 
 
129 Press Release, Two Individuals Arrested for Conspiracy to Import Falsely Labeled 
Fish, supra note 128. 
130 True World Foods, supra note 55.  
131 Id. 
132 Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
133 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Texas Honey Broker Sentenced to Three Years 
in Prison for Avoiding $37.9 Million in Tariffs on Chinese-Origin Honey (Nov. 14, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/texas-honey-broker-sentenced-three-years-prison-
avoiding-379-million-tariffs-chinese (discussing United States v. Groeb Farms, Inc., No. 
1:13-cr-00139 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2013) (Appendix A, #33)). 
134 Id. 
135 See supra Chart 2. 
136 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6. 
137 The ability of private parties to file FCA actions and participate in them is unique in 
American law. This aspect of the FCA is discussed more fully in Part IV (c). See infra text 
accompanying notes 241–63. 
138 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, ¶ 13. 
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including sources in Ukraine, France, and, until 2009, China.139 In 
2009, an antidumping duty of approximately 160% was imposed on 
“small diameter” graphite electrodes imported from China.140 
Imposition of this duty rendered the Chinese products unprofitable and 
GES located other suppliers, at a significantly higher cost.141 Not long 
after, GES discovered that it was losing long-time customers to a 
competitor that was selling small diameter graphite rods at a lower 
cost.142 The prices at which the competitor, Ameri-Source, was selling 
graphite electrodes were consistently lower than anything that could be 
obtained on the global market—except from Chinese manufacturers.143 
This led GES to suspect that Ameri-Source, was continuing to import 
graphite electrodes from China and somehow avoiding the 160% 
antidumping duties.144 
Using its contacts within the industry, GES investigated what 
Ameri-Source was doing.145 GES hired investigators who traveled to 
the Mumbai, India “facility” that allegedly was producing the graphite 
rods for Ameri-Source.146 The “factory” was a “dilapidated warehouse” 
incapable of “any significant job work,” and “too small to load or 
unload an international shipping container of the type normally used to 
transport small diameter graphite electrodes and other graphite 
products.”147 It was incapable of graphite electrode production, which 
“requires very expensive and highly advanced technology.”148 
Additionally, through conversations with its customers and by 
examining the rods sold by Ameri-Source, GES determined that the 
rods sold by Ameri-Source had been stripped of all manufacturer-
identifying data.149 Unlike the GES electrodes, which “were clearly 
labeled as ‘Graphite India’ with metal tags, specification sheets, and 
 
139 Id. ¶ 22. 
140 Antidumping Duty Order: Small Diameter Graphite Electrodes from the People’s 
Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg. 8775 (Feb. 26, 2009). 
141 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, ¶¶ 58–60. 
142 Id. ¶ 56. 
143 Id. ¶ 57. 
144 Id. ¶ 58. As GES explained: “The market price for small diameter graphite electrodes 
in the US was approximately $2.25 per pound. Ameri-Source was taking business away 
from legitimate market participants by offering small diameter graphite electrodes at $1.85 
per pound and that the country of origin is India, South Korea or the Ukraine.” Id. 
145 Id. ¶¶ 61–65. 
146 Id. ¶ 47. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. ¶ 64. 
PIERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:46 PM 
2018] Trade Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier 27 
of White Collar Crime 
‘Graphite India’ stickers on the product,” the Ameri-Source electrodes 
had no identifying markings except for a small, white “Made in 
India”150 sticker on the end of the rods.151 GES contacted Indian 
manufacturers of graphite electrodes who confirmed that they had 
“never sold electrodes to Ameri-Source and that any representation that 
Ameri-Source had imported electrodes from India . . . was false.”152 
Using a worldwide shipping database, GES traced the route of the 
Ameri-Source graphite rods.153 The route showed that Ameri-Source’s 
rods came from China through India, from China through South Korea, 
or directly from China into the United States.154 In each case, false 
shipping manifests concealed China as the true country of origin and 
enabled Ameri-Source to avoid paying millions of dollars in 
antidumping duties.155 GES brought its information to the DoC, the 
United States partially intervened, and the case settled for $3 million. 
In a parallel criminal proceeding, Ameri-Source pled guilty to two 
felony counts of smuggling goods into the United States.156 
Fraud to avoid countervailing and antidumping duties was also at 
issue in United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Ink Manufacturing Co., 
Ltd.157 Nation Ford Chemical Company (Nation Ford) and others 
petitioned and obtained imposition of countervailing duties on “CVP-
23,” ink used in printer cartridges manufactured in India and China.158 
Nation Ford had previously presented evidence that production of 
CVP-23 in these countries was subsidized by their governments and 
dumped in the United States, and that such actions were harming 
domestic producers of CVP-23.159 As a result, countervailing duties 
were imposed on CVP-23 by the DoC.160 Thereafter, importers 
continued to import CVP-23, but falsely claimed that the ink was 
 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. ¶ 69. 
153 Id. ¶¶ 50–51. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. ¶ 43. 
156 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Four Pennsylvania-Based Companies and Two 
Individuals Agree to Pay $3 Million to Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded 
Customs Duties (Feb. 22, 2016). 
157 Dickson, supra note 35. 
158 Id. ¶ 27. 
159 Id. ¶ 28. 
160 Id. ¶ 29. The petitioners also obtained anti-dumping duties on CVP-23 upon proof of 
dumping practices on United States markets by Chinese and Indian manufacturers. Id. 
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produced in Japan and Mexico.161 In so doing, they avoided millions of 
dollars in antidumping and countervailing duties.162 Nation Ford and 
its CEO, John Dickson, brought a case under the civil FCA against 
Toyo Ink Manufacturing Company163 and the United States 
intervened.164 The case settled for $45 million. Dickson, as relator, 
received $7,875,000 of the settlement.165 
3. Misrepresentations Regarding Country of Origin to Qualify for 
U.S. Government Contracts 
The Buy American Act provides that goods supplied to the federal 
government, except those specifically exempted, must be produced in 
the United States.166 The Trade Agreements Act requires that if goods 
sold to the United States government are not made in the United States, 
they must be made in a country with an approved reciprocal trade 
agreement with the Unites States.167 The Trade Expansion Act requires 
that goods deemed essential to national defense be manufactured in the 
United States or specified ally countries.168 Dishonest individuals and 
companies that seek to sell nonconforming goods to the federal 
government misrepresent the country where goods are produced to 
meet this requirement.169 This false representation constitutes crimes 
under Titles 16, 18, and 21 of the United States Code as well as 
violations of the civil FCA under Title 31.170 
Our database revealed no criminal prosecutions between 2000 and 
2016 for contract fraud involving misrepresentations regarding country 
of origin. However, there were multiple civil cases brought under the 
FCA. Examples of civil cases include a case against an Indiana 
 
161 Id. ¶¶ 33, 98, 132. 
162 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Japanese-Based Toy Ink and Affiliates in New 
Jersey and Illinois Settle False Claims Allegations for $45 Million (Dec. 17, 2012). 
163 Dickson, supra note 35. 
164 Press Release, supra note 162. 
165 Id. 
166 See Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)–(d) (1988) (repealed Jan. 5, 2010); see 
also 41 U.S.C. §§ 1801–03 (2012) (replacing the original Buy American Act which was 
repealed). 
167 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2501-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 
115-140). 
168 Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C.S. § 1862 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
169 The incentive for this type of fraud likely will increase if the current Administration 
seeks to “maximize” buy American laws for federal procurement contracts. Exec. Order No. 
13788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 18, 2017). 
170 See, e.g., Safina Office Products, supra note 58 (Appendix A, #2, 3, 4, 5) (use of the 
FCA); Apego, supra note 15 (Appendix A, #32); Giddens, supra note 9 (Appendix A, #51). 
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company that sold Malaysian-made furniture to the United States 
Marine Corps,171 an Ohio company that sold Chinese-made lighting 
products to the United States Air Force and Environmental Protection 
Agency,172 an Illinois company that sold Chinese information 
technology, equipment, and services to numerous federal agencies 
(including Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Internal Revenue Service, 
and Secret Service),173 a New Jersey company that sold Chinese 
electronics to federal agencies while falsely representing that the 
countries of origin were South Korea and Mexico,174 and a Minnesota 
company that sold Chinese and Malaysian medical products for cardiac 
patients and for use in spinal surgeries while falsely representing that 
the products were manufactured in the United States or other approved 
countries.175 
The case of United States ex rel Reade Manufacturing Company v. 
ESM Group, Inc.176 is an example of defendants who misrepresented 
the country of origin of their product to meet national security 
requirements for sale of goods deemed essential to national defense to 
the U.S. government.177 In 2004, Reade Manufacturing Company 
(Reade), located in New Jersey, was the only supplier approved by the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to sell ultra-fine magnesium 
powder to the U.S. military services.178 Magnesium powder “is a highly 
volatile substance” used to produce countermeasure flares.179 These 
flares are carried by military aircraft to defend against incoming heat-
seeking missiles.180 Because ultra-fine magnesium powder is deemed 
“critical to the support of national defense,”181 by authority of the 
Secretary of the Army, it must be manufactured in the United States or 
 
171 Complaint at ¶ 18, United States ex rel. Furniture by Thurston, Inc. and Lee Thurston 
v. J. Squared, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-01058-RMC (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2008) (Appendix A, #14). 
172 Scutellaro, supra note 4. 
173 Liotine, supra note 65. 
174 Complaint at 18, United States ex rel. Simmons v. Samsung Electronics America, 
Inc., No. AW-11-2971 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2011) (Appendix A, #44). 
175 United States ex rel. Cox v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 0:12-cv-02562-PAM-JSM (D. Minn. 
Oct. 5, 2012) (Appendix A, #47). 
176 Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27. 
177 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, Section 806, P.L. 105-261 
(Oct. 17, 1998), 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (Presidential Directive, Apr. 20, 2017 regarding steel 
industry). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. ¶ 12; Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. ¶ 16. 
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Canada.182 Reade began losing long-time customers who said they were 
switching suppliers because they could purchase ultra-fine magnesium 
powder elsewhere “at a significantly lower price.”183 Reade officials 
suspected their competitors were importing magnesium powder from 
China, “the largest and least expensive source of fine magnesium 
powder.”184 
Reade officials began to investigate. Using their sources within the 
industry, Reade officials learned that a Chinese company was shipping 
ultra-fine magnesium powder into the United States by falsely labeling 
it as “magnesium desulphurization reagent” and hiding it inside 
aluminum rods.185 Reade officials traced the falsely labeled shipments 
through a publicly available database of trade shipments and confirmed 
the shipments were coming from China.186 Reade also obtained a 
sample of the mislabeled product and confirmed that an ingredient 
present in the powder, silicon, was typical of magnesium powder 
manufactured in China.187 
Reade filed a complaint under the civil FCA alleging contract and 
import fraud by its competitor.188 Reade alleged that by falsely 
describing the ultra-fine magnesium as “magnesium desulphurization 
reagent,” Reade’s competitors paid a 5% import duty, rather than the 
305.56% duty applicable to “ultra-fine” magnesium powder imported 
from China.189 The United States intervened.190 The defendants settled 
for $8 million.191 In a parallel criminal prosecution, five former 
employees and agents of Reade’s competitor pled guilty to related 
charges.192 One of the defendants, the former President of one of the 
companies involved, agreed to pay more than $14 million in 
 
182 Id. In addition, the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce has issued an anti-dumping order 
subjecting ultra-fine magnesium power imported from China to a duty of 305.56%. Id. ¶ 21. 
183 Id. ¶ 28. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. ¶ 32. 
186 Id. ¶ 35. 
187 Id. ¶ 36. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. ¶ 70. 
190 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tennessee and New York-Based Defense 
Contractors Agree to Pay $8 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Involving 
Defective Countermeasure Flares Sold to the U.S. Army (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www 
.justice.gov/opa/pr/tennessee-and-new-york-based-defense-contractors-agree-pay-8-
million-settle-false-claims-act. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. See also Magness, supra note 50. 
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restitution.193 Reade received $400,000 as relator’s share of the 
award.194 
The Reade case demonstrates an important point. When businesses 
and individuals misrepresent the country of origin for the purpose of 
qualifying goods for sale to the federal government, they violate one 
provision of the civil FCA.195 In addition, as demonstrated in the Reade 
case, they may well violate another provision of the FCA196 if they are 
falsifying the country of origin at the time goods are imported. 
Falsifications at the point of entry into the United States will certainly 
help conceal the true source of goods when the goods are later sold to 
the U.S. government. It is reasonable to think that many companies that 
falsely represent to the U.S. government that their goods comply with 
“made in America” requirements, begin their fraud at the time such 
goods are imported. Given this reality, it is surprising how few 
contracting fraud cases brought by the Department of Justice and 
relators under FCA provisions do not allege and prove all FCA 
violations being committed. Prosecutors and relators may well be 
“leaving money on the table” by not investigating and including import 
fraud when investigating and charging contracting fraud cases.197 For 
the same reason, corporate counsel should ensure that clients who sell 
goods to the federal government, and who are in the supply chain of 
such goods, are not at risk of liability for import fraud under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1)(G). Businesses involved in any aspect of “port to point of 
sale” of goods sold to the federal government may well have liability 
 
193 Press Release, supra note 190. 
194 Id. 
195 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). As an aside, when 
this section is violated, § 3729(a)(1)(B) may also be violated. Section 3729(a)(1)(B) creates 
liability for using or causing to be used a false record or material statement to a false claim. 
See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 174; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Telecommunications Firm to Pay Us $1 Million to Settle Alleged Violations of the Trade 
Agreements Act (July 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telecommunications-firm-
pay-us-1-million-settle-alleged-violations-trade-agreements-act (Appendix A, #27); 
Furniture by Thurston, supra note 171. 
196 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140) (known as the 
“reverse” false claims act provision). 
197 Scutellaro, supra note 4 is an example where both types of fraud appear to be present 
but only contracting fraud was alleged in the complaint. The complaint in this case alleged 
that “large quantities” of “lighting products were being shipped from China to the United 
States” but bore the insignia “Made in China.” This allegation would indicate that there was 
evidence of import fraud as well as contracting fraud as a result of misrepresentations about 
the country of origin. Id. 
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under the FCA for import fraud committed by their importers given the 
FCA’s “reckless disregard” mens rea requirement.198 Prices “too good 
to be true” probably are. Ignoring suspicious pricing, coupled with 
sloppy import protocol, may well be enough to subject all companies 
in the supply chain of products sold to the U.S. government to liability 
under the civil FCA for import fraud. Corporate compliance plans 
should include training to businesses that sell products to the federal 
government about their potential “downstream” import fraud and 
liability. Effective corporate compliance plans should include systems 
for detecting import fraud that may be occurring within the client’s 
business or affiliated businesses. 
IV 
THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHY IT IS A POTENT WEAPON 
AGAINST TRADE FRAUD 
“[The False Claims Act] creates market place incentives to 
encourage the private sector to do the public’s work.”199 
As noted supra,200 all of the civil trade fraud cases brought by the 
U.S. Department of Justice from 2000 to 2016 have been under the civil 
FCA. The FCA is a unique statute. The FCA creates an unusual 
partnership between law enforcement and private individuals. Heralded 
for decades as the premier tool to fight white collar crime,201 the FCA 
is well-designed for the complexities of trade fraud. This Section 
explains what the FCA is and how it applies to trade fraud. 
Experience has shown that the civil FCA is effective in fighting 
fraud in heavily regulated fields such as healthcare,202 defense 
 
198 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
199 Interview by the Corporate Crime Reporter with John R. Phillips (Nov. 9, 1987) 
[hereinafter Phillips Interview]. Phillips is generally credited with passage of the 1986 
Amendments, which revitalized the FCA. In this interview, Phillips discusses how the 1986 
Amendments came about, and how they changed dynamics within the United States 
Department of Justice and within industries relevant to FCA liability. Id. 
200 See supra Chart 2; see also Appendix A. 
201 “[T]he False Claims Act . . . has been the Department’s primary civil enforcement 
tool to combat fraud. . . .” Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14 (1998) (testimony of Donald K. Stern, U.S. 
Att’y, Dist. Mass. and Chair, Att’y Gen.’s Advisory Comm., U.S. Dep’t of J.). 
202 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 
Billion From False Claim Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www 
.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fis 
cal-year-2016 (“[The] vigorous pursuit of health care fraud prevents billions more in losses 
by deterring others who might otherwise try to cheat the system for their own gain.”); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud 
PIERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:46 PM 
2018] Trade Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier 33 
of White Collar Crime 
contracting,203 and environmental regulation.204 The FCA’s 
effectiveness is due, in large part, to the public-private partnership it 
creates between individuals, known as qui tam relators, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice. As the FCA has shown, where complex and 
multi-layered transactions are standard fare, guidance from industry 
insiders such as relators as to whether fraud is occurring, who is 
committing it, and what evidence exists, is invaluable.205 The evolution 
of the FCA in the healthcare field is telling. In 1987, the first year after 
the FCA was amended and thereby galvanized as a fraud-fighting tool, 
there were only three FCA relator cases involving health care fraud and 
zero dollars realized in recoveries from such cases. In 2016, four 
decades later, there were 501 such cases and $2.499 billion realized in 
recoveries from healthcare FCA cases.206 Only recently has the FCA 
been used to combat trade fraud.207 This Part discusses how the FCA 
works and how its unique partnering of individuals, private attorneys, 
and law enforcement208 is as well-suited to the complexities of trade 
 
Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-announces-largest-health-care-fraud-settlement-its-history (stating that Pfizer 
agreed to pay $2.3 billion for violation of the FCA); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and 
Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmith 
kline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report (stating 
the $3 billion plea deal is the largest health care fraud settlement in the history of the FCA). 
203 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Files and 
Simultaneously Settles False Claims Act Lawsuit Against Defense Contractor And Its 
President For Multi-Year Fraud Involving Sale of Defective Weapons Sights to U.S. 
Military And Other Agencies (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr 
/manhattan-us-attorney-files-and-simultaneously-settles-false-claims-act-lawsuit-against 
(stating that over $25 million was recovered from a defense contractor for falsifying weapon 
sight information and violating the FCA). 
204 See Consent Decree, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deep Water Horizon” in the Gulf 
of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 18–30 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.justice 
.gov/enrd/file/838066/download (summarizing, in part, the application of the FCA to BP 
company after the Deepwater Horizon incident based on its false reports of drilling margins) 
The consent decree ordered a $20 billion payout. Id. 
205 Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940–47 (discussing how the FCA 
provides regulators with much needed inside information about fraud and other wrongdoing 
in society). 
206 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics – Health and Human Services 
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/918361/download. Relators 
recovered over $450.5 million from these cases. Id. 
207 See supra Chart 1 & Chart 2. 
208 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False 
Claims Act, 31 FL. ST. U. LAW REV. 603, 606–607 (2004) [hereinafter Games and Stories]; 
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fraud as it is to healthcare or other complex frauds against the 
government. 
A. History of the FCA: Diseased Mules and Defective Muskets 
Frustrated that diseased mules and defective muskets were being 
delivered to Union troops by government contractors, President 
Abraham Lincoln urged the passage of the FCA in 1863.209 It was 
quickly passed by Congress in a very similar form to the current 
FCA.210 The FCA has been amended several times since,211 most 
dramatically in 1986.212 The FCA grows out of a long tradition of using 
private parties to supplement law enforcement efforts.213 One court 
 
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 53–54, 61–62 (2002) [hereinafter 
Private Justice]. 
209 132 CONG. REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman). 
According to the 1863 investigation, one thousand mules delivered to the Union army were 
“unfit for the service, and almost worthless, for being too old or too young, blind, weak-
eyed, damaged, worn out or diseased. . . . .” Id. See also False Claims Act Amendments: 
Hearings on H.R. 3334 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Gov’t Relations of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986); The History and Development of Qui Tam, 
1972 WASH. U. L. REV. 81 (1972); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English 
Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C.L. REV. 539 (2000). 
210 The original FCA contained both criminal and civil penalties for its violation. Act to 
Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696-
98 (1863). In 1874, the criminal and civil provisions were separately codified. REV. STAT. 
3490–94 and 5438 (1875). The civil FCA is now found at 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-31 (Lexis 
through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The criminal provisions are found in 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 286, 
287, 1001, 1002 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). Significant amendments in 1986 
changed the qui tam provisions of the statute, see supra note 166. 
211 REV. STAT. 3490–94 and 5438 (1875); 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 
1943); False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986); 
Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1362; Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1621 (clarifying parts of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 & 
3731). 
212 False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986). 
The 1986 Amendments are credited with revitalizing the FCA, which had fallen into disuse. 
JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.04[H] (Wolters Kluwer 
2017) (1993). The 1986 Amendments increased the amount of recovery a private party who 
brought an FCA action (termed a “relator”) could receive; guaranteed a minimum amount 
of recovery for the relator; relaxed the “jurisdictional bar” provisions which had prevented 
many relators from filing suit; clarified and relaxed the mens rea requirement; expanded the 
statute of limitations; clarified the burden of proof; and added protection for whistleblowers 
who are retaliated against by their employers. Private Justice, supra note 208, at 47–48. 
213 Known as “informer” actions, law suits that use private parties to supplement law 
enforcement efforts, termed “informer” actions, were common in thirteenth century England 
and colonial America. See Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 909–17. These 
early actions provided for minimal, if any, oversight of “informers” and were subject to 
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explained that the FCA operates on the theory “that one of the least 
expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the 
treasury is to make the perpetrators . . . liable to actions by private 
persons acting . . . under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the 
hope of gain.”214 
The FCA remained relatively dormant until amendments in 1986 
invigorated the role of private parties, known as “qui tam relators.”215 
“Qui tam” comes from the Latin phrase, “qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur” which means “he who pursues 
this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.”216 Under 
the “qui tam” provisions, any person, not just the party injured by the 
alleged conduct, may file an action under the FCA.217 This plaintiff, 
known as a “relator,” is deemed to have standing on the theory that the 
federal government is the injured party and may assign its right to sue 
under the FCA.218 Eyeing the success of the invigorated 1986 FCA, 
thirty states and a number of municipalities have passed their own 
FCAs covering false claims submitted to state governments.219 
 
many abuses. By the mid-twentieth century, they had been abolished in England and fell 
into disuse in America. Id.; Beck, supra note 209. 
214 United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885). See also United States ex 
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n. 5 (1943) (quoting Griswold with approval); 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997). 
215 Private Justice, supra note 208, at 48–49. 
216 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n. 1 
(2000). See also The History and Development of Qui Tam, WASH. U. L. Q. 81, 83 (1972) 
citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (1st ed. 1768). 
217 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
218 In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, the Supreme Court held “that adequate 
basis for the relator’s suit . . . is to be found in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has 
standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor. The FCA can reasonably be 
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” Vt. Agency 
of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 765, 773. See also 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. 
L. No. 115-140). 
219 State False Claims Act, TAF EDUC. FUND., https://taf.org/Public/Resources_by 
_Topic/FAC__False_Claims_Act/State_FCA_s/Public/Resources_by_Topic/FCA__False 
_Claims_Act/State_FCA_s.aspx?hkey=a0879c08-1539-44f6-8b51-f8aed240c448 (listing 
of all states and municipalities with FCA statutes); see James F. Barger, Jr., Pamela H. Bucy, 
Melinda M. Eubanks & Marc S. Raspanti, States, Statutes and Fraud: An Empirical Study 
of Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465 (2005) (discussing and evaluating 
state FCA statutes). These states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, and Washington. Additionally, the District of Colombia and several notable cities 
such as Chicago and New York have statutes modeled after the FCA. Id. See The 1986 False 
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B. How Does the FCA Work? 
The FCA prohibits seven types of conduct, all of which pertain to 
the submission of false or fraudulent claims to the U.S. government.220 
The FCA covers any person who: 
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval; 
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim; 
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), 
(E), (F), or (G); 
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, 
or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes 
to be delivered, less than all of that money or property; 
(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of 
property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to 
defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without 
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true; 
(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, 
public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a 
member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge 
property; or 
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money 
or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly 
and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government . . . .221 
Liability under the FCA attaches only if conduct is committed 
“knowingly.” The FCA defines knowingly as “actual knowledge” or 
conduct committed with “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” 
of the truth or falsity of the claim submitted.222 Liability under the FCA 
attaches only if the falsity is material to the claim.223 The FCA defines 
materiality as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of 
 
Claims Amendment Act, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND,   
http://taf.org/public/drupal/TAF-fca-25anniversary_12%281%29.pdf (last visited May 17, 
2017). 
220 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
221 Id. 
222 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
223 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(b)(4) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”224 Each 
violation of the FCA carries a mandatory penalty of between $11,000 
and $21,563 per false claim,225 as well as treble damages,226 and 
attorneys’ fees and costs.227 Cooperation and disclosure to the U.S. 
Department of Justice are rewarded. If a party discloses to the U.S. 
government all information about false claims it has submitted to the 
government and cooperates with the government, then no penalties will 
be assessed and damages are reduced from treble to double.228 
However, this disclosure must be prior to the commencement of any 
action by the government against the person for the fraud at issue.229 
All trade fraud falls under § 3729(a)(1)(G) of the FCA, known as the 
“reverse false claim” section. This provision creates liability for any 
person who “knowingly conceals or knowing and improperly avoids or 
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government.” Misrepresentations about the nature of goods or the 
country of origin of goods imported to avoid or minimize import duties 
fall within § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
U.S. Customs Form 7501 is the starting point to determine if trade 
fraud has been committed. Every importer must file a U.S. Customs 
Form 7501 with each shipment of goods brought into the United 
States.230 As discussed above,231 all trade fraud falls into two general 
types of false claims or statements under the FCA. Both types of fraud 
will arise from false statements and claims made on U.S. Customs 
Form 7501. Box 28 (description of merchandise),232 Box 32 (value),233 
and Box 33 (dutiable rate)234 will be false when importers misrepresent 
the nature of the product they are importing. Box 10 (country of 
 
224 Id. See also Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1996 (2016). 
225 See Department of Labor Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Catch-Up 
Adjustment, 81 Fed. Reg. 43429, 43430 (July 1, 2016). 
226 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
227 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
228 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
229 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
230 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ENTRY 
SUMMARY (CBP FORM 7501) [hereinafter CBP FORM 7501]. 
231 See supra Chart 2 and text accompanying notes 57–153. 
232 CBP FORM 7501, supra note 230. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
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origin)235 and Box 33 (dutiable rate)236 will be false when defendants 
misrepresent the country of origin. Box 26 (importer of record)237 is the 
likely defendant. Depending on the knowledge, or reckless disregard 
of facts, additional defendants may include individuals and businesses 
that handled shipping, wholesaling, retailing, or sales service of the 
imported goods.238 
Although the fraud itself may be difficult to detect and prove, use of 
the FCA to pursue trade fraud is simple and straightforward. Every 
false statement or claim made by an importer will be on Form 7501. 
With trade fraud, there is no need to delve into “implied certification” 
analysis.239 Nor will materiality be a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in 
trade fraud cases—as is often true in other uses of the FCA. Materiality 
“look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of 
the alleged misrepresentation.”240 Therefore, the accuracy or falsity of 
information provided to CBP on Form 7501, which is directly utilized 
in calculating the appropriate duties to be paid, is material because that 
information is determinative of Customs’ assessment of money owed 
to the government. 
 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). See supra text 
accompanying notes 193–96. 
239 The “Implied Certification” analysis is a body of False Claims Act case law that has 
been developed addressing a theory of False Claims Act liability “commonly referred to as 
implied false certification.” Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 1995. “According to 
this theory, when a defendant submits a claim, it impliedly certifies compliance with all 
conditions of payment. But if that claim fails to disclose the defendant’s violation of a 
material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement, so the theory goes, the defendant 
has made a misrepresentation that renders the claim “false or fraudulent” under § 
3729(a)(1)(A).” Id. (Universal Health Services was denoted as an “implied false 
certification” case because it was alleged Defendants defrauded the Medicaid program by 
submitting reimbursement claims that made representations about the specific mental health 
services provided by specific types of professionals, but that failed to disclose serious 
violations of Massachusetts Medicaid regulations pertaining to staff qualifications and 
licensing requirements for these services and therefore such services were actually provided 
by nurses and not physicians.) In Universal Health Services, Inc., the Court approved of the 
basis of liability colloquially referred to as “implied certification theory” and in doing so 
eliminated the distinction of the legal fiction of “implied certification” vs. “express 
certification” (circumstances in which a defendant is alleged to submitted a claim that is 
false because it expressly certifies compliance with a statute or regulation yet fails to meet 
the requirements of that statute or regulation). The Court provided that the determinative 
factor—in any type of False Claims Act case—is that a misrepresentation about compliance 
with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the 
Government’s payment decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act. Id. 
240 Id. 
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C. Procedure Under the FCA 
The procedure under the FCA is unique. Relators initiate FCA 
actions by filing the case in the name of the U.S. government as well 
as in their own name.241 The style of an FCA case brought by a relator 
is titled United States ex rel. [name of relator] v. [defendant]. Relators 
are required to file their complaints under seal, not serving it on a 
defendant, and provide a copy of their complaint to the U.S. 
Department of Justice along with a written report of “all material 
evidence and information” the relator possesses.242 The relator’s 
complaint remains under seal, often for months or even years, to allow 
the Department of Justice an opportunity to investigate the charges 
made by the relator.243 The secrecy provided by the sealed complaint 
protects a defendant’s reputation if the relator’s information amounts 
to nothing,244 as well as facilitates the Department of Justice’s 
investigation of the relator’s information.245 
After investigating the matter, the Department of Justice determines 
whether it will intervene in the relator’s case.246 Often when it 
intervenes, the Department of Justice amends the relator’s complaint 
based upon its own investigation.247 After intervention, the Department 
 
241 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
242 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). Not only does the 
FCA require that relators provide DOJ with all information they have pertaining to an FCA 
case prior to filing the complaint, it is to relators’ advantage to disclose full information to 
DOJ filing a complaint. Id. As a strategic matter doing so helps overcome potential hurdles. 
Id. Relators have a greater chance of qualifying as an “original source” and thus overcoming 
jurisdictional bar issues. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(e) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). Early 
and full disclosure also helps demonstrate they are “first to file,” thus solidifying their right 
to bring a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(5) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
243 ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 33 (2000). 
244 Private Justice, supra note 208, at 69–70. 
245 Phillips Interview, supra note 199; WEST, supra note 243, at 33; Sen. Rep. 99-345, 
99th Cong. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5281. 
246 A unique investigative avenue available to the Department of Justice in FCA cases is 
the “civil investigative demand,” or “CID.” 31 U.S.C.S. § 3733 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 
115-140). This investigatory tool allows the Department of Justice authority to demand 
documents, compel answers to interrogatories, and obtain oral testimony. CIDs can be 
extremely powerful prosecutorial tools. See, e.g., Private Justice, supra note 208; PAMELA 
H. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ch. 6 (LJSP 2001) 
(discussing the investigation of health care fraud cases). 
247 The Department of Justice amends most complaints filed by relators because of the 
additional information the Department gathers with the more extensive investigatory tools 
it has at its disposal compared to the investigative resources available to qui tam relators. 
For a discussion of these resources, see Private Justice, supra note 208, at 51 n. 291. 
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of Justice sometimes handles the entire case,248 in other cases, the 
Department of Justice works hand-in-hand with relators sharing 
investigative and litigation duties.249 
If the Department of Justice declines to intervene in the relator’s 
case, then a relator may pursue the case alone.250 Historically, the 
Department of Justice has intervened in less than twenty-five percent 
of cases filed by relators,251 and relators who proceeded on their own 
after the Department of Justice declined to intervene as a plaintiff have 
enjoyed little success.252 These cases are dismissed more frequently and 
the recoveries are substantially less.253 In the event the Department of 
Justice does not join a relator’s case, the Department of Justice may 
monitor the case and intervene at any time, even for limited purposes, 
such as appeal.254 
Regardless of whether or not it intervenes, the Department of Justice 
retains authority to settle or dismiss a relator’s suit—although the 
relator is given an opportunity in court to be heard before the case is 
settled or dismissed.255 The Department of Justice also retains authority 
 
248 If the Department of Justice intervenes in the case as a relator, it assumes “primary 
responsibility” for the case although the relator remains as a plaintiff and is guaranteed a 
participatory role. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
249 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001); United States ex rel. Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (facts more fully discussed in United States ex rel. Merena v. 
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev’d 205 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 
2000)). 
250 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(3) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
251 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
IN QUI TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS 2, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
edpa/legacy/2011/04/18/fcaprocess2_0.pdf (last visited May 17, 2017). 
252 Private Justice, supra note 208, at 51–52. 
253 In 2016, for example, realtors’ awards in cases in which the Department of Justice 
intervened totaled $2.8 billion, while total relator recovery in cases in which the Department 
of Justice declined to intervene totaled $104.98 million. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Fraud Statistics−Overview (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov /opa/press-
release/file/918361/download. 
254 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(3) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). See, e.g., Vt. Agency 
of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000); United States ex rel. 
Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2001). 
255 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(2)(A)–(B) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). DOJ may 
move for dismissal or oppose a settlement without intervening. See, e.g., Juliano v. Fed. 
Asset Disposition Ass’n, 736 F. Supp. 348, 350–51 (D.D.C. 1990) (DOJ moved to dismiss 
relator’s case after declining to intervene.); United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 
F.3d 335, 340–41 (6th Cir. 2000) (After declining to intervene, DOJ opposed the settlement 
reached by relator and defendant.). 
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to seek limitations on the relator’s involvement in the case256 and to 
seek alternative remedies, such as administrative sanctions, in lieu of 
the relator’s lawsuit.257 Some circuits have held that the Department of 
Justice retains authority to veto any settlement reached by the 
defendants and the relators.258 
Only relators who are “first to file” are eligible to receive a share of 
any judgment recovered259 and, while the statute guarantees relators 
between 15% and 30% of a judgment,260 the actual award within this 
statutory range depends upon the relator’s helpfulness to the 
government in pursuing the case.261 Judgments under the FCA have 
been large, some as large as $2.4 billion, $1.4 billion, $540 million and 
$325 million.262 Relators’ awards have also been large. In 2016, for 
example, relators received awards of $98 million, $84 million, and $51 
million.263 
D. Why the FCA Is Effective in Fighting Fraud 
For four reasons, the FCA has proven extraordinarily successful in 
combatting fraud against the federal government. First, because of its 
ability to enlist the help of private persons who have information about 
ongoing fraud, the FCA brings otherwise unknown information about 
fraud to law enforcement’s attention. Second, the FCA’s unique 
partnering of private individuals, private counsel, and government 
 
256 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
257 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(5) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
258 United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d 330, 333 (4th 
Cir. 2017). 
259 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(5) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). See BOESE, supra 
note 212, at § 4.03(C)(2). 
260 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(d) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). If the DOJ joins the 
relator’s case, the relator is guaranteed at least fifteen percent and up to twenty-five percent 
of any judgment or settlement. If the DOJ does not join the relator’s case, the relator is 
guaranteed twenty-five percent to thirty percent of the judgment or settlement. The award 
to the relator, which must be approved by the court “depends on the extent to which the 
person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action.” Id. 
261 For example, a relator’s case cannot proceed, and is “jurisdictionally barred,” if the 
information brought to the DOJ by the relator was already public, unless the relator is the 
“original source” of the information and the relator disclosed the information to the 
government. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(e)(4) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
262 FY 2009 False Claims Act Settlements, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, 
http://www.taf.org/total2009.htm (last visited May 18, 2017). 
263 Top 15 FCA Cases of 2016, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND (Oct. 26, 
2016), http://www.taf.org/blog/top-15-fca-cases-2016. 
PIERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:46 PM 
42 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19, 1 
authorities supplements limited law enforcement litigative resources. 
Third, as a “punitive” civil cause of action, the FCA’s treble damages 
and mandatory monetary penalties deter future wrongdoing by 
businesses as effectively as a criminal prosecution, but without the 
difficulty and expense of a criminal investigation or trial. Fourth, the 
FCA has demonstrated effectiveness in policing heavily regulated 
industries undergoing policy debate.264 
1. The FCA Provides the Resource of Inside Information 
Complex economic activity is buried in electronic and paper trails, 
concealed in false statements, disguised in layers of organizations, and 
hidden in complex financial transactions. Multiple individuals, offices, 
divisions, companies, and countries, are likely to have participated in 
some stage of a fraud.265 Because few individuals are foolish enough, 
careless enough, or bold enough to submit false claims without creating 
complex cover-ups, there is always concealment. For example, when a 
healthcare provider submits claims to Medicare for services not 
performed, patient files have likely been falsified to corroborate the 
fraudulent claim.266 When quality control tests have been altered, or are 
not performed, records likely have been falsified to reflect that such 
tests were performed to reflect (falsely) and that the product met 
specifications.267 If importers engage in fraud to avoid paying import 
duties, there will be false shipping manifests, customs declarations, and 
product labels.268 There may be diversionary shipping routes spanning 
the globe. Every fraud is hard to penetrate. Trade fraud is even harder. 
Information from those inside the business committing the fraud is 
essential for law enforcement to know what is going on and who is 
doing it. 
For these reasons, fraud cannot be effectively detected or deterred 
without the help of those who are intimately familiar with it.269 Insiders 
 
264 See Private Justice, supra note 208, at 53–54. 
265 Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940. 
266 Pamela Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated 
Crime: An Empirical Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 
383, 434–37 (1994). 
267 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
268 See, e.g., Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, at 16–19. 
269 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care 
Providers, 67 N. C. L. REV. 855, 871–81 (1989); Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of 
Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 406–13 (1993); 
John C. Jeffries & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of 
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know what has happened, who is to blame, and where evidence is 
located, and their participation is essential.270 Insiders know what is 
fake and what is real. They can explain customs and habits of the 
business or industry, direct investigators to evidence of fraud, interpret 
evidence, and provide industry expertise.271 Information about fraud 
from an industry insider is sometimes the only way to alert the 
government and the public to the wrongdoing that is occurring. Without 
insiders, fraud may not be apparent, perhaps for years. By then much 
harm may have been done and evidence to prove what happened may 
have disappeared. An insider’s early warning can prevent harm to 
unaware victims and enable law enforcement to take timely action. As 
law enforcement officials who have worked with relators explain, 
“[w]histleblowers are essential to our operation. Without them, we 
wouldn’t have cases.”272 
The FCA’s relator provisions provide both an incentive for 
individuals with information about fraud to come forward, and a 
mechanism to do so. Historically, relators have been employees and 
former employees of defendants. They have also been competitors of 
defendants.273 This is not surprising. Employees are the first to see or 
discover that fraud is being committed. Competitors are often the first 
hurt by other businesses’ fraud. These groups have a “bird’s eye” view 
of fraud and the harm it inflicts. As one seasoned prosecutor said when 
 
Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1103–17 (1995); William H. Webster, An 
Examination of FBI Theory and Methodology Regarding White-Collar Crime Investigation 
and Prevention, 17 AM. CR. L. REV. 275, 276–77 (1980); Hearing Before Subcomm. on 
General Oversight and Investigation of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 105th 
Cong. 16 (1998) (testimony of William F. Baity, Acting Director, Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network); Medicare at Risk: Emerging Fraud in Medicare Programs: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. 126–35 (1997) (Prepared Statement of Pamela H. Bucy). 
270 Private Justice, supra note 208, at 60–62; Games and Stories, supra note 208, at 614–
16. 
271 Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940–41. 
272 Justin Gillis, Whistleblowing: What Price Among Scientists?, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 
1995, at A21 (quoting Lawrence J. Rhoades, a division director at the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, which polices federal health research for scientific 
misconduct). See also Health Care Initiatives Under the False Claims Act that Impact 
Hospitals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15 (1998) (statement by Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General 
for Legal Affairs, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (indicating that the FCA, 
a purpose of which is to encourage whistleblowing, has been an essential tool in combating 
fraud). 
273 See BOESE, supra note 212, at §§ 4.01(B)(1)–(3). 
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announcing a multi-million-dollar settlement of an FCA trade fraud 
case brought by a relator: 
This case is an excellent example of the essential public service a 
whistle-blower can perform by partnering with the government to 
expose illegal conduct that adversely affects the public fisc.274 
Our review of trade fraud cases pursued by Department of Justice 
from 2000 to 2016 shows that relators come from three groups: 
competitors, employees or former employees of defendants, and 
industry insiders.275 The largest group of relators are competitors of 
defendants. These businesses have been most immediately and 
dramatically impacted by a defendant’s dishonesty. They have lost 
customers and contracts to defendants that underpriced them by 
cheating on import duties. Relators in trade fraud cases have also been 
employees of defendants, many of whom lost or quit their jobs after 
alerting supervisors, in vain, of ongoing import fraud within the 
company. A few of the relators in trade fraud cases have been industry 
insiders: individuals who had enough knowledge of the field to spot 
those who were engaging in import fraud. 
2. The FCA Supplements DOJ Resources 
The FCA creates a mechanism not only for relators to provide 
information about fraud to federal agencies but also a way for relators’ 
counsel to work with Department of Justice attorneys and federal 
agents and thereby supplement the Department of Justice’s litigative 
resources. By including the relator as a co-plaintiff with the Department 
of Justice, the FCA creates a working partnership between relators, 
their attorneys, and government prosecutors and agents.276 This co-
plaintiff relationship is unique. While there are a number of statutes 
that create mechanisms for individuals to provide information of 
wrongdoing to law enforcement authorities and receive monetary 
compensation for doing so,277 no other statute creates a structure for a 
whistleblower to proceed as co-plaintiff with the federal government 
or share in the litigative duties on the case.278 
 
274 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Settles Civil Fraud 
Lawsuit Against Jewelry Companies Engaged in a Decade-Long Customs Fraud Scheme 
(Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/August11/noble 
jewelrysettlementpr.pdf. 
275 See generally Appendix A. 
276 See, e.g., Games and Stories, supra note 208, at 608–19. 
277 See Private Justice, supra note 208. 
278 Id. at 61–62. 
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The FCA crafts this unusual partnership by giving the Department 
of Justice and the relator certain rights. It preserves the Department of 
Justice’s guidance on the case, control of precedent, and direction of 
Department of Justice policy by requiring that relators present their 
information to the Department of Justice prior to filing a complaint and 
under seal.279 These steps allow the Department of Justice the 
opportunity to investigate a relator’s information before the case 
proceeds further and before the allegations become public.280 Such a 
protocol helps ensure that a case is meritorious, that the Department of 
Justice’s initiatives are not disrupted, and that innocent defendants’ 
reputations are not tarnished.281 The FCA gives the Department of 
Justice “primary responsibility” for the case, including authority to 
amend the complaint, oppose certain actions by a relator, and petition 
the court for limitations on the relator’s role.282 
The FCA also preserves certain rights for the relator by guaranteeing 
the relator a minimum share in any recovery,283 requiring that the 
Department of Justice notify the relator about government decisions in 
the case,284 giving the relator the opportunity to be heard on dismissal 
or settlement,285 the right to proceed in the case as co-plaintiff if the 
government intervenes, and the right to continue the case as sole 
plaintiff if the government does not intervene.286 
Trade fraud cases brought by relators demonstrate the level of 
assistance knowledgeable relators and experienced relators’ counsel 
can provide to the Department of Justice. Relators have discovered fake 
“factories” in India,287 volatile magnesium being imported under false 
label (as a more stable and safe magnesium product),288 fake drugs,289 
counterfeit computer equipment,290 and products misdescribed to avoid 
paying import duties.291 Qui tam relators have purchased dishonest 
 
279 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
280 31 U.S.C.S. § 3733 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).  
281 Games and Stories, supra note 208, at 609–10. 
282 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
283 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(d) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
284 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
285 Id. 
286 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(3) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
287 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6. 
288 Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27. 
289 Giddens, supra note 9. 
290 Cone, supra note 76. 
291 Nguyen, supra note 54. 
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competitors’ products and tested them, confirming ingredients from 
disallowed countries.292 Relators have used their knowledge of 
shipping patterns within industries to trace false shipping routes and 
routes designed to disguise the true country of origin.293 Relators have 
provided computer hard drives showing fraud,294 incriminating 
statements of defendants,295 false records,296 and accurate records297 
that dispute the false records. Relators have provided names of 
corroborating and knowledgeable witnesses.298 In every trade fraud 
case brought by relators, the relators were the first to detect fraud. They 
have saved the U.S. Treasury millions of dollars, protected the 
marketplace from corruption, and consumers from unsafe products. 
3. The FCA Provides an Effective “Middle Ground” Between 
Criminal Prosecution and Civil Liability 
Criminal prosecution of wrongdoers carries a “big bang for the 
buck.” Nothing gets the attention of wrongdoers more than an 
indictment or a “perp walk.” However, criminal prosecutions are 
difficult, time-consuming, and resource intensive.299 They should be. 
The U.S. Constitution provides criminal defendants with rights not 
granted to defendants in civil cases, including the right to a grand jury 
finding of probable cause,300 assistance of counsel,301 confrontation of 
witnesses,302 speedy trial,303 and unanimous verdict.304 Criminal 
convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of 
 
292 Scutellaro, supra note 4. 
293 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6. 
294 Simmons, supra note 174. 
295 Jimenez, supra note 1. 
296 In every trade fraud case, false statements appear on U.S. Customs Form 7501. See 
supra text accompanying notes 231–38. 
297 See, e.g., Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6. The relator in this case used its 
knowledge of the industry to research the Port Import/Export Reporting Service (PIERS) 
database to confirm that the defendant had imported goods from China through India as part 
of the defendant’s fraudulent conduct of concealing China as the true source of its goods. 
298 Wells, supra note 59. 
299 Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (criminal prosecution “is the most potent regulatory mechanism 
society possesses.”). 
300 See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. 
301 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
302 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
303 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
304 See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §22.1(e) (4th ed. 2016). 
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an offense305 and proof of specific intent to break the law.306 The burden 
of proof required in criminal cases is hard to meet, especially when 
complex transactions are at issue and misunderstandings of the law 
create a legal defense.307 
For many crimes, criminal prosecution is the only way to protect the 
public from perpetrators other than through criminal prosecution. 
However, for white-collar frauds against the government, this is not 
true. Every fraud against the federal government is also a civil cause of 
action under the FCA and thus a civil lawsuit under the FCA provides 
an effective alternative to criminal prosecution.308 The FCA’s stiff 
penalties, treble damages, and heightened mens rea requirement carry 
a “big bang for the buck,” and can deter future wrongdoing 
effectively.309 However, because the FCA is a civil action and not a 
criminal prosecution, FCA cases are easier to bring and win than 
criminal prosecutions. They are a cost-efficient, effective way to deter 
trade fraud. 
  
 
305 See LAFAVE, supra note 304, at § 26.4(h). 
306 Id. 
307 Private Justice, supra note 208, at 3–4. 
308 Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and 
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1802 (1992). See also BUCY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 236 (West Academic 2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean 
“Criminal”? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 
B. U. L. REV. 193, 202–08 (1991); Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: 
Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 391 (1994). 
309 See IBM Will Pay the U.S. $14.8 Million to Settle False Claims Charge, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 5, 1993, at C15; Peter Loftus, Corporate News: Judge Orders J&J to Pay $1.2 Billion, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2012, at B3; Teledyne Settles U.S. Suit, Agrees to Pay $2.15 Million, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1993, at A4; Vauhini Vara, Oracle Agrees to Pay $98.5 Million to 
Settle Suit Over GSA Contracts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2006, at B3. 
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4. The FCA Promotes Effective Regulation in Industries that Are 
Undergoing Significant Policy Debate 
The FCA is also very effective at fighting fraud in an industry 
undergoing significant public policy disagreement. Instead, the 
information about fraud which the FCA brings forth helps shed light 
on systemic changes that can be made within the industry to discourage 
and prevent fraud. 
For example, the Medicare and Medicaid programs have been 
subject to constant, vigorous debate on multiple fronts since they were 
enacted.310 However, throughout these ongoing disagreements on 
fundamental public policy issues involving these programs, the FCA 
has been deployed consistently and successfully to combat fraud by the 
wide variety of healthcare providers. The ongoing policy debates have 
not detracted from the FCA’s ability to combat fraud in these programs. 
Rather, FCA cases identifying fraud in governmental healthcare 
programs have helped identify aspects of these programs that could and 
should be changed to reduce fraud, save taxpayers money that was 
being diverted to fraud, improve the programs, and enhance patient 
care.311 
The FCA can serve the same role regarding trade fraud. There are 
many similarities between health care fraud and trade fraud. Both are 
heavily regulated. In both, there is significant financial incentive to 
commit fraud and endless ability to conceal it. Although health care 
fraud involves payments from the federal government for medical 
services and trade fraud involves payments due to the United States as 
import duties and tariffs, both types of fraud are explicitly covered by 
the FCA.312 The government payment structure in the healthcare field 
is based on an elaborate scaffolding of government regulations and 
 
310 See 141 CONG. REC. E1868 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Brian 
Bilbray); 141 CONG. REC. H10333-34 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1995); Saving Medicare, Hearing 
Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 4, 37-58 (1995); 149 CONG. REC. 
S15927-29 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003). 
311 See 147 CONG. REC. S1008 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Grassley); 
Health Care Initiatives Under the False Claims Act That Impact Hospitals, Hearing Before 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15-
25, 44 (1998) (statement of Lewis Morris Ass. Inspector General for Legal Affairs, Office 
of Inspector General) (summarizing problems with fraud in Health Care and suggesting that 
FCA audits improve the systems); Medicaid Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: Threatening the 
Health Care Safety Net, Hearing Before S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. 10–11 (2005) 
(statement of James Moorman, President and CEO, Taxpayers Against Fraud). 
312 Section 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA pertains to almost all health care fraud, while § 
3729(a)(1)(G) pertains to trade fraud. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Lexis through Pub. L. 
No. 115-140); 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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administrative procedures. An understanding of this underlying 
regulatory system and how it can be manipulated by dishonest 
providers is crucial to successful detection, proof, and deterrence of 
health care fraud. The duty and tariff system in trade is similarly 
constructed upon an elaborate base of government regulation and 
administrative procedure. Like healthcare, successful detection and 
deterrence of trade fraud depends upon intimate knowledge of how this 
trade and tariff system can be manipulated. Within both healthcare and 
trade fraud, only insiders have enough access to see that fraud is 
occurring, who is doing it, and how to prove it. This is why the FCA, 
with its ability to incentivize insiders to come forward and work with 
law enforcement, is as ideally suited to fighting trade fraud as it is to 
combatting health care fraud. 
E. How to Enhance the FCA’s Effectiveness as a Weapon Against 
Trade Fraud 
1. Coordinate Federal Law Enforcement Efforts 
Collaboration between the various federal agencies that have a role 
in combatting trade fraud is essential to effectively detecting, 
prosecuting, and ultimately deterring trade fraud. To successfully 
coordinate the multi-agency efforts directed at trade fraud, the 
Department of Justice should utilize the interagency task force model 
used successfully for decades by multiple U.S. Attorneys’ offices to 
combat health care fraud, another type of fraud that by its nature 
involves many investigative agencies and expertise. 
The primary entities involved in fighting trade fraud are the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI), 
both part of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Justice and its U.S. Attorney Offices, the Department of Commerce and 
its International Trade Administration, and the International Trade 
Commission. Each of these Departments or Agencies play unique roles 
in detecting and prosecuting trade fraud. For example, ICE HSI 
investigates a wide array of international crime,313 the CBP is the 
 
313 See Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T,  
https://www.ice.gov/hsi (last updated Aug. 22, 2017) (HSI is a critical investigative arm of 
the Department of Homeland Security and is a vital U.S. asset in combating criminal 
organizations illegally exploiting America’s travel, trade, financial, and immigration 
systems.). 
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“boots on the ground” at the U.S. borders and has a mission centering 
on monitoring the flow of people and items entering the United States 
and collecting tariffs and duties.314 The Department of Justice is 
charged with prosecuting cases, coordinating law enforcement 
investigations, evaluating relator FCA actions, and working with 
relators on FCA actions.315 The DoC, specifically the International 
Trade Administration (ITA), and ITC promote specific trade 
enforcement initiatives and establish duty classifications, such as 
antidumping and countervailing duties.316 
That so many entities have so many roles and competing 
responsibilities regarding trade demonstrates the importance of 
coordinating trade fraud efforts for coherent trade policy. This is 
especially true with regard to the prosecution of trade fraud where the 
stakes are high––for victims as well as putative defendants. Consider 
the following scenario. A relator files an FCA complaint in federal 
district court alleging that a defendant is perpetrating a scheme to evade 
antidumping duties. The complaint should come to the attention of an 
Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) prior to filing in one of the 94 U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices. Pursuant to Department of Justice guidelines and 
protocols, the AUSA will then communicate with attorneys at the 
Department of Justice’s Civil Fraud Division in Washington D.C. to 
seek guidance and approval to pursue the case. 
The AUSA and/or main Department of Justice trial attorneys likely 
will contact the International Trade Administration (ITA) within the 
DoC since this agency oversees the administration of antidumping 
orders. The AUSA will gather information from ITA staff about the 
technical aspects of the specific product and the scope of the particular 
order to determine if the product at issue in the FCA complaint actually 
qualifies under the order. The Department of Justice attorneys will 
serve as a liaison between the relator and their counsel to integrate their 
knowledge of the alleged fraud into an investigative strategy that will 
be implemented by the CBP agents and ICE HSI agents. 
 
314 See About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/about (last 
updated Nov. 21, 2016). 
315 See Organization, Mission and Function Manual: Civil Division, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-civil      
-division (last updated Sept. 9, 2014); see also 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730 (Lexis through Pub. L. 
No. 115-140). 
316 See International Trade Administration (ITA), U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
https://www.commerce.gov/doc/international-trade-administration#2/43.4/-112.0 (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also About the USTC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
PIERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:46 PM 
2018] Trade Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier 51 
of White Collar Crime 
Such coordination likely will require monitoring the imports and 
duty rates declared by the defendant and cross-referencing these reports 
and facts with the relator’s knowledge. More investigation likely will 
be needed, quite possibly with the relator’s active involvement, which 
may include interpreting industry procedures, identifying further 
evidence and possible witnesses, and even wearing recording devices 
to talk with targets and suspects. The Department of Justice will likely 
issue Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs),317 that are unique to the 
FCA investigation requesting pertinent information from the 
Defendant. The responses to the CIDs as well as additional evidence 
gathered in the ongoing investigation will then be communicated to the 
CBP and ICE HSI to further direct the investigation. Ultimately, the 
information uncovered will form the basis of the government’s decision 
whether to intervene in the relator’s FCA action, whether to also 
criminally prosecute the defendant in a parallel action, or whether the 
allegations lack merit. 
As can be seen, at all phases of this hypothetical investigation, 
communication between the various entities is paramount. This 
example demonstrates why collaboration and established 
communication channels among all affected federal agencies is crucial. 
Not only would creation of interagency trade fraud task forces facilitate 
such communication and collaboration, it would also help eliminate 
redundancies in the learning curve for AUSAs first encountering trade 
fraud cases. Additionally, because trade fraud cases can implicate a 
number of federal districts and foreign countries, utilizing centralized 
task forces, along with specialized training for the Department of 
Justice attorneys in such task forces, would further this needed 
communication among districts and foreign countries. 
Such interagency task forces have been used for years in the area of 
health care fraud. These health care fraud task forces have experience 
bringing together Department of Justice attorneys, FBI agents, Postal 
Inspectors (who have jurisdiction and experience in investigating mail 
fraud and wire fraud schemes), Special Agents with the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), Drug Enforcement Agents and 
their state counterparts who investigate pharmacy and other drug-
related provider fraud, Department of Labor, Department of Veterans 
Affairs, and other entities as necessary based on the context of a 
 
317 31 U.S.C.S. § 3733 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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specific case.318 These task forces also integrate the relators who bring 
forth information about health care fraud, work with government law 
enforcement personnel to further investigate the case when needed, and 
through their counsel, often provide significant litigative resources.319 
This task force approach has worked well in healthcare and should be 
adopted with regard to trade fraud. 
2. Dedicate Specialists Within DOJ to Trade Fraud 
In addition to encouraging, training, and facilitating individual 
USAOs to utilize interagency task forces directed at trade fraud, the 
Department of Justice would benefit by better coordinating its 
personnel with the “Centers for Excellence” created by the Department 
of Homeland Security and the CBP. The international scope of trade 
does not comport with the localized structure of the U.S. Attorney 
Offices. 
The CBP has taken such an approach to combatting trade fraud by 
creating “Centers for Excellence and Expertise.” These “Centers of 
Excellence” focus on certain categories of imported products.320 For 
instance, there is a “Base Metals Center” located in Chicago, Illinois; 
an “Apparel, Footwear and Textiles Center” in San Francisco, 
California; and a “Pharmaceuticals, Health and Chemicals” center in 
New York, New York.321 In total there are ten Centers of Excellence. 
This initiative demonstrates the specific product category approach 
necessary to effective trade enforcement. 
The Department of Justice should establish a team of attorneys 
experienced in trade fraud to be similarly dedicated to specific areas of 
trade fraud enforcement. To best integrate with the established and 
successful CBP Centers of Excellence, the Department of Justice 
should place at least one attorney dedicated to pursuing trade fraud to 
be stationed in the U.S. Attorneys’ offices where a CBP Center of 
Excellence operates who is similarly focused on prosecuting trade 
fraud violations related to those product groups. By working directly 
with the CBP’s subject-matter experts, these Department of Justice 
 
318 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, AstraZenica to Pay $7.9 Million to Resolve 
Kickback Allegations (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/astrazeneca-pay-79 -
million-resolve-kickback-allegations; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and 
Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmith 
kline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report. 
319 Id. 
320 19 C.F.R. 101.10 (2016). 
321 Id. 
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trade fraud specialists would gain knowledge of fraud involved with 
the importation of particular product groups and be better equipped to 
coordinate agency efforts. 
Furthermore, by incorporating the Department of Justice into 
otherwise routine CBP trade enforcement, the FCA can be utilized 
more often to prosecute trade fraud as opposed to CBP regulatory 
penalties. By utilizing the FCA instead of Customs’ enforcement 
remedies, the United States can recover significantly more money from 
trade fraud actions and provide greater deterrence from future fraud.322 
Whereas Customs fraud statutes provide penalties for “a civil penalty 
in an amount not to exceed the domestic value of the merchandise,”323 
the FCA mandates treble damages and civil monetary penalties of 
$10,957 to $21,916 for each false claim.324 
3. Enhance Transparency in Shipping Records 
Making international shipping records more centralized and 
transparent would greatly enhance the ability of private parties, 
specifically FCA relators, to investigate and corroborate their 
allegations through shipping records prior to filing a trade fraud FCA 
action. Enhancing the ability of private parties, specifically putative 
FCA relators, to access public, full shipping records would shift 
investigatory resources and labor from government investigators to 
their private attorney general partners and help fight trade fraud. 
The most important set of records to make more easily accessible to 
the public, and thus to potential whistleblowers of trade fraud, is the 
Entry Summary, Customs Form 7501.325 This form is not among the 
publicly available documents corresponding to an import entry. 
However, much of the information corresponding to a shipment is 
publicly available, such as importer of record, shipping date, the 
disclosed contents of the shipment, the foreign port of lading, the U.S. 
port of unlading, and the transport method and vessel. While this “truly 
publicly available” information is helpful, it primarily provides 
information about the shipping voyage of the imported goods, not what 
the importer declares to Customs, such as the declared country of origin 
or the declared duties for the shipment. What is declared to the CBP on 
 
322 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
323 19 U.S.C.S. § 1592(c)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
324 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
325 CBP FORM 7501, supra note 230. 
PIERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:46 PM 
54 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19, 1 
Customs Form 7501 is the pertinent information to either confirm or 
refute suspicions of trade fraud. 
The Department of Homeland Security does allow for the disclosure 
of CBP-generated records including the Form 7501 information 
necessary to confirm or refute trade fraud suspicions.326 The 
information defined as Customs Generated Records includes the “Entry 
Number”––which is the CBP-assigned number unique to each Entry 
Summary (CBP Form 7501) and the “Entry Type”––and most 
important for trade fraud investigations, the sub-entry type––which 
“further defines the specific processing type within the entry category 
(i.e., free and dutiable, quota/visa, antidumping/countervailing duty, 
and appraisement).”327 These two pieces of information are vital to the 
identification and corroboration of trade fraud because they identify the 
specific Entry Summary to cross-reference with other shipping and 
manufacturing details (often supplied by relators), and most 
importantly, that identify the rate of duty claimed by the importer––the 
evasion of which is the crux of trade fraud. 
This needed information is already collected and maintained in an 
organized manner by CBP. However, currently, the only way a private 
party such as a relator may obtain access to it is through the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) process, which is particularly unsuited for 
FCA realtor actions.328 The FOIA process is problematic because it 
allows the potential defendant to learn it is being investigated by a 
private party and to challenge the disclosure of the information (i.e., 
the potentially incriminating customs submissions). Putative 
defendants can prevent the FOIA disclosure by filing a “reverse FOIA” 
action against the requesting party.329 Thus, for all practical purposes, 
utilizing the existing FOIA procedures to obtain relevant data to 
prepare a trade fraud FCA complaint simply alerts the potential 
defendant that it is being investigated and who is investigating it. By 
providing a warning to a potential defendant, the FOIA process allows 
now-alerted defendants to alter and better conceal trade fraud to subvert 
 
326 See 80 Fed. Reg. 49256, 49261 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
327 See 80 Fed. Reg. 49256, 49259 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
328 See id. at 49262. 
329 See 19 C.F.R. § 103.35 (2012). “CBP will provide business submitters with prompt 
written notice of receipt of FOIA requests or appeals that encompass their commercial 
information. The written notice will describe either the exact nature of the commercial 
information requested, or enclose copies of the records or those portions of the records that 
contain the commercial information. The written notice also will advise the business 
submitter of its right to file a disclosure objection statement as provided under paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section.” Id. 
PIERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:46 PM 
2018] Trade Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier 55 
of White Collar Crime 
detection. For these reasons, making the Customs Generated Records, 
specifically the information submitted on Customs Form 7501, 
available in a public, searchable database that could be accessed 
without alerting potential defendant would tremendously enhance the 
effectiveness of the FCA as a trade fraud weapon. 
Similar publicly searchable databases are utilized in other contexts 
of government contracting and claim submission, such as in healthcare. 
These databases are invaluable resources to inform the public about the 
actions of healthcare providers as well as sources that help relators 
corroborate and build their cases to present to the Department of 
Justice. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid publishes “Medicare 
Provider Utilization and Payment Data” each year.330 This data 
provides the billing data, including type of service and frequency, for 
every medical provider in the nation that has submitted claims for 
payment to Medicare.331 This billing data is a critical resource for law 
enforcement and private parties, including FCA relators, because it 
identifies billing outliers, a red flag indicator of fraud. Similarly, the 
Affordable Care Act established the “Open Payments” database that 
collects and publishes information about drug and device company 
payments to physicians and teaching hospitals for expenses like travel, 
research, and speaking fees, as well as ownership interests that 
physicians and their immediate family have in drug and medical device 
companies.332 This database has proven to be a vital tool for 
investigating potential kickback or Stark Law-related FCA violations. 
Establishing a full and open database for trade law claim 
submissions should be no different. The collection of appropriate tariffs 
and duties is similarly in the interest of public policy. Furthermore, the 
success of these important healthcare databases demonstrates why the 
potential argument that public disclosure of Customs Form 7501 
information violates importers’ right to confidential business 
information is unconvincing. The publication of the duties actually paid 
and country of origin declared is no more confidential than the methods 
 
330 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier, 
CENTERS FOR MEDICATE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statis 
tics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Phy 
sician-and-Other-Supplier.html (last updated June 15, 2017). 
331 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier 
PUF CY2015, CENTERS FOR MEDICATE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://data.cms.gov 
/Medicare-Physician-Supplier/Medicare-Provider-Utilization-and-Payment-Data-Phy/sk9b 
-znav/data (last visited Aug. 11, 2017). 
332 See 78 Fed. Reg. 9458–528 (Feb. 8, 2013). 
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and manner by which a physician bills Medicare or the payments made 
by a pharmaceutical company to physicians who have ownership 
interests in company products or who are paid to speak on the 
company’s behalf. Simply put, when private companies’ submission of 
claims to the government impacts the public fisc and important public 
policy issues such as healthcare and trade, the pertinent details of those 
claims should be made easily accessible to the public. 
4. Maintain More Consistent and Centralized Reporting 
Another way to enhance the use of the FCA (as well as criminal 
prosecution) as a way to combat trade fraud is to make public 
information about trade fraud cases more readily available. Currently, 
there is no way to search databases maintained by the U.S. 
Administration of Courts, the Department of Justice,333 PACER, or 
docket searching systems such as Bloomberg Law to gather 
information on criminal or civil trade fraud cases. Case information is 
not uniformly collected or stored. There is considerable disparity in the 
sophistication, thoroughness, and type of information available in these 
databases. For example, the documents currently uploaded to PACER, 
and systems such as Bloomberg Law docket search, currently include 
scanned copies of docket entries and pleadings that do not use Optical 
Character Reading (OCR). Without OCR, a document cannot be 
electronically searched or indexed to permit searching within a 
document collection. This sharply limits the usefulness of search 
systems for finding docket materials, because a search of unindexed 
files will only return items that were specifically tagged with particular 
keywords. Creating PDFs directly from the original source Word or 
WordPerfect documents, or running an OCR program on scanned 
documents would make the searches within PACER and docket 
 
333 A significant hurdle when searching DOJ press releases on trade fraud is the lack of 
standardization as to where and in what format the press releases are made available. The 
DOJ press release database and archive available on DOJ’s website included a good number 
of press releases, but these two collections were not complete. For example, we examined 
press releases available at DOJ’s news link, https://www.justice.gov/news websites, as well 
as websites separately maintained by the ninety-four individual U.S. Attorney’s offices and 
found there was no consistent format of the DOJ press releases. Some cases were reported; 
some were not. Some releases contained case names; others did not. Some releases reported 
settlement amounts; others did not. Some releases were issued when a case was filed, an 
indictment returned, or an individual arrested; others did not. Some settlements were 
reported and details provided while other settlements were never reported or provided 
incomplete information. Consistent reporting, listing, and archiving of press releases would 
be invaluable to inform DOJ and relators how to better plead and prepare both criminal 
prosecutions of trade fraud and use of the FCA in trade fraud. 
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systems more accurate as well as far more efficient. Consistent text 
searchability would also allow docket searching systems, particularly 
commercial services, to index the individual filings and improve the 
usability of the keyword search feature. 
Simple, cost-free changes would remedy this search problem. A 
more readily available way to access public information about trade 
fraud cases would be invaluable to the Department of Justice in crafting 
theories of these cases, directing development of precedent, and 
identifying trends and problems. Easier access to what is already public 
information would help relators and their counsel evaluate, screen, and 
prepare cases for presentation to the Department of Justice and filing 
of complaints. More information about trade fraud and who is liable 
would help businesses and their counsel establish internal systems to 
prevent such fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
As the tide of global trade rises, so will trade fraud. Regardless of 
the merits of the free-trade-protectionism debate, trade fraud should be 
aggressively pursued. No one has the right to lie about what they are 
bringing into a country. This Article discussed the variety of 
stakeholders injured when trade laws are flouted and import duties 
avoided. Not only is a country’s treasury robbed of millions of dollars 
in import duties, but honest businesses are hurt by dishonest 
competitors, consumers are exposed to unsafe products, and industries 
suffer economic losses because of companies that dump products and 
engage in predatory pricing. 
To gain a better understanding of trade fraud enforcement trends, we 
constructed a database of all trade fraud cases pursued in the United 
States between 2000 and 2016. While such a database would appear to 
be readily available, it is not because of inconsistencies in reporting and 
incomplete government data sets. Thus, our database is the first to 
compile all trade fraud cases brought in recent years. This database 
shows that trade fraud cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice 
increased nine-fold between 2000 and 2016. Forty-two percent of these 
cases have been criminal prosecutions, while fifty-eight percent have 
been civil cases. All civil cases have been brought under the FCA and 
almost every FCA case has been initiated by relators under the FCA’s 
qui tam provisions. All trade fraud cases fall into two basic types of 
fraud: misrepresentations regarding the nature of products imported, 
and misrepresentations regarding a product’s country of origin. We 
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discussed the characteristics of each type of fraud and the practical and 
policy implications of pursuing each type. We also discussed how and 
why many trade fraud cases brought by the Department of Justice and 
relators under the FCA fail to include import fraud charges even though 
such fraud likely is occurring and is chargeable under the FCA and 
applicable criminal statutes. 
The FCA has proven uniquely and extraordinarily effective over the 
past four decades in combatting health care fraud, defense fraud, 
environmental fraud, and other frauds upon federal and state 
governments. We discussed how and why it can be as effective in 
detecting and deterring trade fraud. We explained how the FCA works, 
how it applies to trade fraud, and what makes it effective against trade 
fraud. We also discussed the implications for businesses that have 
exposure to trade fraud liability. Suspicious pricing (“prices too good 
to be true”) coupled with sloppy import protocols by suppliers, and the 
FCA’s “reckless disregard” mens rea, likely subject every business 
engaging in the import of goods as well as in the purchase, sale, or 
marketing of imported goods to liability under the FCA. We discussed 
steps businesses can take to ensure that that their corporate compliance 
plans, in-house training, and internal investigation protocols 
adequately address their exposure for trade violations. Lastly, we 
identified steps policymakers, particularly the U.S. Departments of 
Justice and Homeland Security, could take to enhance the FCA’s 
effectiveness in combatting trade fraud. 
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APPENDIX A 
Trade Fraud Cases 
2000-2016 
 
CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD1 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
2000         
11/7/00 
United 
States v. 
Universal 
Fruits and 
Vegetables 
et al.2 
(C.D. Cal. 
2000) 
Provided 
false 
information 
about 
shipping 
dates to 
avoid 
antidumping 
duties on 
fresh garlic 
imported 
from China. 
FCA3 2 Civil  Complaint 
filed4  
 1 
2001-2004 
NONE 
       
2005        
5/19/05 
United 
States ex 
rel. Safina 
Office 
Products v. 
Office  
Depot,5 
(D.D.C. 
2003) 
 
Defendants 
misrepresent-
ed where 
products 
were 
manufactured 
to qualify 
products for 
sale to the 
U.S. 
government. 
Products 
were in fact 
manufactured 
in China and 
Taiwan, 
which are not 
approved 
under the 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act. 
FCA6 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act7 
3 Civil  $9.8 
million 
settlement 
Relators (Safina 
Office Products 
and two of its 
executives), 
competitors of the 
defendant, 
collectively 
received $1.47 
million as relator’s 
award. 
 
2 
  
 
1 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
2 Complaint, United States v. Universal Fruits and Vegetable Corp. et al., No. 00-11698R 
(C.D. Ca. Nov. 7, 2000). 
3 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
4 Summary judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $3,914,474. Judgement held 
unenforceable for lack of jurisdiction. United States v. Universal Fruits and Vegetable Corp., 
29 Ct. Int’l Trade 673,  Slip Op. 06-79 at 12 (May 25, 2006). See also United States v. 
Universal Fruits and Vegetable Corp. 370 F.3d. 829 (9th Cir. 2004). 
5 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Safina 
Office Products v. Office Depot, No. 1:03-cv-00003-RMC (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2003). 
6 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
7 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD8 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
5/19/05 
United 
States ex 
rel. Safina 
Office 
Products v. 
Office 
Depot,9 
(D.D.C. 
2003) 
 
Defendants 
misrepresent-
ed where 
products 
were 
manufactured 
to qualify 
products for 
sale to the 
U.S. 
government. 
Products 
were in fact 
manufactured 
in China and 
Taiwan, 
which are not 
approved 
under the 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act. 
FCA10 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act11 
3 Civil  $4.75 
million 
Settlement 
Relators (Safina 
Office Products 
and two of its 
executives), 
competitors of the 
defendant, 
collectively 
received $712,500 
as relator’s award.  
3 
10/18/05 
United 
States ex 
rel. Safina 
Office 
Products v. 
Office 
Depot, 
12(D.D.C. 
2003) 
Defendants 
misrepresent-
ed where 
products 
were 
manufactured 
to qualify 
products for 
sale to the 
U.S. 
government. 
Products 
were in fact 
manufactured 
in China and 
Taiwan, 
which are not 
approved 
under the 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act. 
FCA13 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act14 
3 Civil  $7.4 
million 
settlement 
Relators (Safina 
Office Products 
and two of its 
executives), 
competitors of the 
defendant, 
collectively 
received $1.11 
million as relator’s 
award.  
4 
  
 
8 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
9 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, supra note 4. 
10 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
11 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
12 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, supra note 5. 
13 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
14 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD15 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
2006        
2/10/06 
United 
States ex 
rel. Safina 
Office 
Products v. 
Office 
Depot, 
16(D.D.C. 
2003) 
Defendants 
misrepresent-
ed where 
products 
were 
manufactured 
to qualify 
products for 
sale to the 
U.S. 
government. 
Products 
were in fact 
manufactured 
in China and 
Taiwan, 
which are not 
approved 
under the 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act. 
FCA17 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act18 
3 Civil $5.02 
million 
settlement  
Relators (Safina 
Office Products 
and two of its 
executives), 
competitors of the 
defendant, 
collectively 
received $753,000 
as relator’s award.  
5 
4/07/06 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Schweizer 
v. OCÉ 
N.V,19 
(D.D.C. 
2006) 
Defendants 
falsely 
claimed that 
imported 
printed 
products 
were from 
the 
Netherlands 
when they 
were from 
China. 
FCA20 ? Civil  Settlement 
amount of 
$1.2 
agreed 
upon by 
DOJ and 
defendant; 
relator 
objected. 
Remanded.
21 
 6 
  
 
15 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
16 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, supra note 5. 
17 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
18 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
19 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Schweizer 
v. OCÉ N.V., No. 1:06-cv-00648-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2006). 
20 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
21 United States ex rel. Schweizer v. OCÉ N.V, 677 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding 
that DOJ did not have unfettered discretion to settle FCA cases when a relator objects to the 
settlement; courts must examine the reasonableness of the settlement agreement). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD22 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
2007        
6/7/07 
United 
States v. 
Wong, et 
al.,23 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007) 
Six 
individuals 
and ten 
seafood 
companies 
charged with 
conspiracy to 
avoid anti-
dumping 
custom duties 
by falsely 
labeling over 
ten million 
pounds of 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
sole, grouper, 
flounder, and 
conger pike.  
Lacey Act24 2 Criminal  Arrested NA 7 
4/4/07 
United 
States v. 
Premier 
Manufactu
ring, Inc.,25 
(D. S.C. 
2007) 
Understated 
weight of 
cigarettes to 
avoid 
millions of 
dollars in 
import 
duties. 
FCA26 
 
1 Civil  $3.1 
million 
settlement 
(Defendant 
previously 
agreed to 
pay $7.16 
million 
restitution 
as part of a 
criminal 
plea.) 
NA 8 
  
 
22 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
23 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Individuals Arrested for Conspiracy to Import 
Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007 
/June/07_enrd_413.html. 
24 6 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
25 United States v. Premier Manufacturing Inc., No. 2:05-cr-00344-DCN (D.S.C. Mar. 
25, 2005). 
26 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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of White Collar Crime 
CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD27 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
2008        
1/14/08 
United 
States v. 
Wong,28 
(C.D. Cal. 
2008) 
Conspiracy 
to avoid anti-
dumping 
custom duties 
by falsely 
labeling over 
ten million 
pounds of 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
sole, grouper, 
flounder, and 
conger pike. 
Lacey Act29 2 Criminal Defendant, 
David 
Wong, 
plead 
guilty to 
two 
misdemea-
nor 
violations 
of the 
Lacey Act. 
Sentenced 
to one year 
and one 
day in 
prison 
followed 
by one 
year of 
supervised 
release.  
$25,000 
fine 
NA 9 
3/12/08 
United 
States v. 
True 
World 
Foods 
Chicago, 
LLC30 
(C.D. Cal. 
2007) 
Conspiracy 
to avoid anti-
dumping 
custom duties 
by falsely 
labeling over 
ten million 
pounds of 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
sole, grouper, 
flounder, and 
conger pike. 
Lacey Act31 2 Criminal Defendant, 
True 
World 
Foods 
Chicago, 
LLC, plead 
guilty to 
violation of 
the Lacey 
Act. 
Sentenced 
to a 
fine of 
$60,000. 
Forfeiture 
of 
$197,930 
NA 10 
  
 
27 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
28 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Illinois Resident Pleads Guilty to Illegally 
Dealing in Falsely Labeled Fish From Vietnam (Jan. 14, 2008), https://www.justice.gov 
/archive/opa/pr/2008/January/08_enrd_026.html. 
29 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
30 United States v. True World Foods Chicago, LLC, No. 2:07-cr-01271 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
15, 2007). 
31 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD32 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
5/12/08 
United 
States v. 
Intertex 
Apparel 
Groups, 
Inc.33 
(S.D.N.Y. 
2008) 
 
 
Scheme to 
avoid import 
duties by 
importing 
into the 
United States 
goods 
manufactured 
in China, 
while 
misrepresent-
ing that the 
goods were 
manufactured 
in either 
Russia or 
Korea. 
FCA34 3 Civil $2,798,872 
settlement. 
Relator was a 
former employee 
of defendant. 
Settlement 
percentage not 
known. 
 
11 
10/30/08 
United 
States v. 
Peter 
Xuong 
Lam; 
Arthur 
Yavelberg
35 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008) 
Conspiracy 
to avoid anti-
dumping 
custom duties 
by falsely 
labeling over 
ten million 
pounds of 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
sole, grouper, 
flounder, and 
conger pike. 
Lacey Act36 2 Criminal Two 
defendants, 
Lam and 
Yavelberg, 
proceeded 
to trial. 
Convicted 
by jury. 
NA 12 
2009        
5/19/09 
United 
States v. 
Peter 
Xuong 
Lam37 
(C.D. Cal 
2008) 
Conspiracy 
to avoid anti-
dumping 
custom duties 
by falsely 
labeling over 
ten million 
pounds of 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
sole, grouper, 
flounder, and 
conger pike. 
Lacey Act38 2 Criminal Defendant 
Lam 
sentenced 
to sixty-
three 
months in 
prison. 
Forfeiture 
of $12 
million to 
avoid anti-
dumping 
duties. 
Defendant 
Guitierrez 
sentenced 
to one year 
probation. 
NA 13 
 
 
32 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
33 United States v. Intertex Apparel Groups, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-05313-NRB (S.D.N.Y. 
May 13, 2008). 
34 6 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
35 Press Release, US Dep’t of Justice, Two Found Guilty of Conspiracy Involving the 
Importation and Sale of Falsely Labeled Fish from Vietnam (Oct. 30, 2008), https://www 
.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-enrd-967.html. 
36 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
37 Indictment, United States v. Lam, No. 2:07-cr-00449-PSG (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2007). 
38 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD39 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
6/26/09 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Furniture 
by 
Thurston 
Inc. and 
Lee 
Thurston 
v. J 
Squared 
Inc., d/b/a 
University 
Loft Co.40 
(D.D.C. 
2009) 
Mispresented 
the country 
of origin 
(Malaysian) 
of furniture 
sold to the 
federal 
government. 
FCA41 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act42 
3 Civil $400,000 
settlement. 
Relator, Furniture 
by Thurston Inc. 
and Lee Thurston, 
competitor of 
defendant, 
received $66,000 
as relator’s share.  
14 
2010        
1/20/10 
United 
States v. 
George43 
(D.N.J. 
2010) 
Conspiracy 
to avoid anti-
dumping 
custom duties 
by falsely 
labeling over 
ten million 
pounds of 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
sole, grouper, 
flounder, and 
conger pike. 
Lacey Act44 2 Criminal George, 
GEO of 
Sterling 
Seafood 
Corporat-
ion, plead 
guilty to 
one count 
of 
importing 
falsely 
labeled 
goods and 
one count 
of selling 
falsely 
labeled fish 
with intent 
to defraud. 
(Subseque-
ntly 
sentenced 
to 22 
months in 
prison and 
ordered to 
pay 
$64,173,83
9 
in 
restitution 
and 
$50,000 to 
National 
Fish and 
Wildlife 
Foundation  
NA 15 
 
39 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime.  
40 United States ex rel. Furniture by Thurston, Inc. and Lee Thurston v. J. Squared, Inc., 
No. 1:06-cv-01058-RMC (D.C.C. June 8, 2008). 
41 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
42 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
43 United States v. George, No. 2:10-cr-00029-FSH (D. N.J. Jan. 20, 2010). 
44 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD45 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
1/28/10 
United 
States v. 
Karen L. 
Blyth, et 
al46 (S.D. 
Ala. 2010) 
Defendants 
indicted on 
twenty-eight 
counts for 
falsely 
describing 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
“wild caught 
sole” to 
avoid anti-
dumping 
duties. 
Defendants, 
co-owners of 
seafood 
companies in 
Phoenix, 
Arizona 
(Blyth) and 
Pensacola, 
Florida 
(Phelps). 
Some of the 
fish tested 
positive for 
antibiotics 
banned from 
U.S. food.  
Lacey Act47 2 Criminal Indicted.  NA 16 
2011        
1/13/11 
United 
States v. 
Fastenal 
Co.,48 
(W.D. Mo. 
2011) 
Provided 
false 
information 
to federal 
government 
on contracts, 
including 
country of 
origin. 
FCA49 3 Civil  Settlement 
of $6.25 
million.  
NA 17 
  
 
45 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
46 United States v. Karen L. Blyth, et al., No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 
2010). 
47 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
48 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Minnesota-based National Hardware Store 
Distributor Fastenal to Pay U.S. $6.25 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Jan. 
13, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/minnesota-based-national-hardware-store-dis 
tributor-fastenal-pay-us-625-million-resolve-false. 
49 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD50 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
1/24/11 
United 
States v. 
Blyth et 
al.51 (S.D. 
Ala. 2010) 
Falsely 
described 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
“wild caught 
sole” to 
avoid anti-
dumping 
duties and 
marketed the 
fish as 
expensive 
seafood.  
Lacey Act,52 
Receiving 
smuggled 
goods,53 
misbranding54 
2 Criminal Defendants 
Blyth and 
Phelps pled 
guilty to 
thirteen 
counts. 
NA 18 
5/5/11 
United 
States v. 
Blyth et 
al.55 (S.D. 
Ala. 2011) 
 
 
Falsely 
described 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
“wild caught 
sole” to 
avoid anti-
dumping 
duties and 
marketed the 
fish as 
expensive 
seafood. 
Lacey Act,56 
Receiving 
smuggled 
goods57 
2 Criminal Sentenced 
to thirty-
three 
months 
(Karen L. 
Blyth) and 
twenty-
four 
months 
(David 
H.M. 
Phelps). 
Both fined 
$5000. 
 19 
5/26/11 
United 
States v. 
Popa (S.D. 
Ala. 
2011)58  
Falsely 
described 
imported 
Vietnamese 
catfish as 
“wild caught 
sole” to 
avoid anti-
dumping 
duties and 
marketed the 
fish as 
expensive 
seafood. 
Lacey Act,59 
Receiving 
smuggled 
goods60 
2 Criminal Sentenced 
to thirteen 
months in 
prison. 
 20 
  
 
50 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
51 United States v. Karen L. Blyth, et al., No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 
2010). 
52 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
53 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
54 Id. 
55 United States v. Karen L. Blyth, et al., No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 
2010). 
56 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
57 18 U.S.C.S. § 352 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
58 United States v. Popa, No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2010). 
59 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371–78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
60 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD61 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
6/1/11 
United 
States ex 
rel. Bukh 
v. 
Guldmann, 
Inc.62 (N. 
D. Ill. 
2011) 
Falsified 
country of 
origin in 
sales of 
medical 
equipment to 
Department 
of Veterans 
Affairs. 
FCA63 3 Civil  $2 million 
settlement
64 
Relator was an 
employee of 
defendant. 
21 
8/18/11 
United 
States v.  
Cone et al. 
65 (E.D. 
Va. 2011) 
 
 
Imported and 
sold 
counterfeit 
computer 
networking 
equipment, 
avoided 
import 
duties. 
 
Wire Fraud,66 
Conspiracy67 
Importation 
and sale of 
improperly 
declared 
goods,68 
wire fraud69 
 
1 Criminal Convicted 
by jury70 
NA 22 
 8/31/11 
United 
States ex 
rel.  
Karlin v. 
Noble 
Jewelry 
Holdings 
Ltd.,71 
(S.D.N.Y 
2011) 
Understated 
the value of 
imported 
jewelry.  
FCA72 1 Civil  $3.85 
million 
settlement 
Relator, Kenneth 
Karlin, employee 
of defendant, 
receive $727,000 
relator’s share. 
 
23 
  
 
61 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
62 United States ex rel. Bukh v. Gulmann, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01089-SDM-JSS (N.D. Ill. 
June 1, 2011). 
63 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
64 DOJ did not intervene in the case. $2 Million FCA Settlement, ASHCRAFT & GEREL, 
LLP,  http://ashcraftand gerel.com/news/2-million-fca-settlement/. 
65 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Cone et al., No. 1:10-cr-00317-GBL (E.D. 
Va. Nov. 10, 2010). 
66 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
67 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
68 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 542, 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
69 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
70 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Cone, No. 1:10-cr-00317-GBL (E.D. Va. 
Nov. 10, 2010), rev’d, No. 11-4934 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2013). 
71 Complaint and Jury Demand, United States ex rel. Karlin v. Noble Jewelry Holdings 
Ltd., No. 1:08-cv-07826-JGK-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2011). 
72 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD73 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
2012        
4/24/12 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Dickson v. 
Toyo Mfg. 
Co. Ltd 74 
(W.D.N.C.  
2012) 
Misrepresent
-ed country 
of origin to 
avoid paying 
antidumping 
and 
countervail-
ing duties. 
(Represented 
that product, 
printing ink, 
was 
manufactured 
Japan and 
Mexico, 
when in fact 
ink was 
manufactured 
in China and 
India). 
FCA75 2 Civil 
 
United 
States 
intervenes.  
 24 
5/8/12 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Scutellaro 
v. Direct 
Resource76 
(D.D.C. 
2010) 
Defendants 
falsely 
claimed that 
goods sold to 
the U.S. 
government 
(office 
supplies) 
were 
manufactured 
in a country 
with a 
reciprocal 
trade 
agreement 
with the 
United States 
when in fact 
the goods 
were from 
China, which 
does not have 
such an 
agreement. 
FCA,77 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act78 
3 Civil  $450,000 
settlement. 
Louis Scutellaro, 
owner of a 
competitor of the 
defendant, 
received $675,000 
relator’s share.  
25 
  
 
73 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
74 Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Mfg. Co., No. 3:09-CV-
438 (W.D.N.C. May 14, 2010). 
75 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
76 Complaint, United States ex rel. Scutellaro v. Direct Resources, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
00113-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2010). 
77 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
78 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD79 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
6/8/12 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Ludlow  
v. 
CMAI 
Industries, 
LLC80 
(E.D. 
Mich. 
2012) 
 
 
Misclassified 
auto parts as 
“unfinished” 
to evade $2.5 
million in 
duties. CMAI 
collected the 
duties due 
from its 
customers 
but pocketed 
the money 
instead of 
paying the 
duties. 
FCA81 
 
 
2 Civil 
and 
Criminal 
$6.3 
million 
settlement. 
Guilty plea 
to criminal 
charges. 
Received 
sentence of 
two years’ 
probation 
and 
$25,000 
fine. 
Relator, Theodore 
Ludlow, former 
sales account 
manager of 
defendant, 
received  
$1.2 million as 
relator’s share. 
26 
7/9/12 
United 
States v. 
ADC 
Telecomm
unications 
Inc.82 
(D.D.C. 
2012) 
Defendants 
falsely 
claimed that 
goods it sold 
to the U.S. 
government 
(telecommu-
nications 
hardware, 
such as 
modems) 
were 
imported 
from a 
country 
which has a 
reciprocal 
trade 
agreement 
with the 
United 
States, when 
in fact the 
good were 
imported 
from China, 
which does 
not have such 
an 
agreement.  
FCA,83  
Trade 
Agreements 
Act84 
3 Civil Company 
disclosed 
its 
violations; 
$1 million 
settlement. 
 27 
  
 
79 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
80 Complaint for Violation of the Civil False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Ludlow v. 
CMAI Industries, LLC, No. 2:09-cv-14860-PDB-MKM (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009). 
81 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
82 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Telecommunications Firm to Pay Us $1 Million 
to Settle Alleged Violations of the Trade Agreements Act (July 9, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telecommunications-firm-pay-us-1-million-settle-alleged-
violations-trade-agreements-act. 
83 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
84 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD85 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
8/27/12 
United 
States v. 
Fai Po 
Jewellery 
(H.K.) Co., 
LTD86 (D. 
Ak. 2012)  
 
 
Understated 
value of 
jewelry 
imported into 
the U.S. 
avoiding 
more than $1 
million in 
duties. 
 
Intentionally 
defrauding 
U.S. of 
customs 
duties87 
 
1 Criminal Defendant 
pled guilty 
to one 
count 
inform-
ation. 
Sentenced 
to three 
years of 
probation 
and 
ordered to 
pay 
$800,000 
criminal 
fine, 
restitution 
of 
$1,017,737
, costs of 
investiga-
tion of 
$144,324. 
NA 28 
11/15/12 
United 
States v. 
Chavez 88 
(S.D. Ca. 
2012) 
Avoided $18 
million in 
customs 
duties by 
falsely 
stating that 
more than 
$100 million 
in Chinese 
goods were 
traveling 
through the 
territory of 
the United 
States when 
in fact the 
goods 
entered the 
commerce of 
the United 
States. 
 Conspiracy,89 
Entry of 
goods by 
means of 
false 
statements,90 
Obstruction 
of justice91 
1 Criminal 
 
Chavez 
plead 
guilty and 
was 
sentenced 
to thirty-
seven 
months in 
prison and 
forfeiture 
of property 
located in 
Tecate, Ca. 
NA 29 
  
 
85 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
86 Complaint, United States v. Fai Po Jewellery, No. 3:12-cr-00068-SLG (D.C. Ak. Aug. 
8, 2012). 
87 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
88 United States v. Chavez, No. 3:12-cr-03137-MMA (S.D. Ca. July 23, 2012). 
89 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
90 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
91 18 U.S.C.S. § 1519 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD92 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
11/29/12 
Unites 
States v. 
Garbarino, 
93(S.D.N.Y
. 2012) 
Avoided 
duties owed 
by 
understating 
the weight 
(over 
100,000 
pounds) and 
value (more 
than $10 
million) of 
Russian and 
Iranian 
caviar.  
Entry of 
goods falsely 
classified,94 
Entry of 
goods my 
means of 
false 
statements,95 
Smuggling96 
1 Criminal Defendant 
pled guilty. 
Sentenced 
to time 
served, 
fined 
$10,000, 
and $3 
million in 
restitution.   
NA 30 
12/17/12 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Dickson v. 
Toyo Ink 
Mfg. Co., 
Ltd.,97 
(W.D.N.C. 
2012) 
Misrepresen-
ted country 
of origin to 
avoid paying 
antidumping 
and 
countervail-
ing duties. 
(Represented 
that product, 
printing ink, 
was 
manufactured 
Japan and 
Mexico, 
when in fact 
ink was 
manufactured 
in China and 
India). 
FCA98 2 Civil 
 
$45 million 
settlement. 
Relator, John 
Dickson, president 
of competitor of 
defendant, 
received over 
$7,875,000 as 
relator’s share. 
31 
  
 
92 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
93 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Caviar Distributor Pleads 
Guilty to Multi-million Dollar Customs Fraud Scheme (Nov. 11, 2012), https://www.ice 
.gov/news/releases/caviar-distributor-pleads-guilty-multi-million-dollar-customs-fraud-
scheme. 
94 18 U.S.C.S. § 541 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
95 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
96 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
97 United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Ink Mfg. Co., Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-00438-RJC-
DSC (W.D. N.C. May 14, 2010). 
98 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD99 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
12/22/12 
United 
States v. 
Apego 
Inc.,100 
(N.D. Ga. 
2012) 
 
Conspiracy 
to avoid an 
estimated 
$20 million 
in duties on 
paper by 
“transship-
ing” Chinese 
products 
through 
Taiwan and 
labeling them 
as “Made in 
Taiwan.” 
Entry of 
goods falsely 
classified,101 
Entry of 
goods by 
means of 
false 
statements102 
2 Criminal  Indictment 
filed 
NA 32 
2013        
2/20/13 
United 
States v. 
Groeb 
Farms, Inc. 
et al.103 
(N.D. Ill. 
2013) 
Misrepresen-
ted country 
of origin as 
India or 
Malaysia for 
honey from 
China to 
avoid more 
than $180 
million in 
anti-dumping 
duties. 
Honey tested 
positive for 
Chloramphe-
nicol, an 
antibiotic not 
allowed in 
food products 
in the U.S.  
Entry of 
goods by 
means of 
false 
statements,104 
Smuggling105 
2 Criminal  
 
Charges 
filed and 
deferred 
prosecu-
tion 
agreements 
reached 
with 
companies 
and 
agreements 
to plead 
guilty 
reached 
with 
individual 
defendants. 
NA 33 
3/29/13 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Liotine, v. 
CDW-
Governme
nt, Inc.,106 
(S.D. Ill. 
2012) 
Misrepresen-
ted country 
of origin for 
products 
made in 
China in 
sales to the 
U.S. 
government. 
FCA,107 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act108 
3 Civil 
 
$5.66 
million 
settlement 
Relator, Joe 
Liotine, former 
sales 
representative of 
defendant, 
received 
$1,585,892 as 
relator’s share. 
34 
 
99 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
100 Criminal Indictment, United States v. Apego, Inc., No. 1:12-cr-00350-SCJ-AJB (N.D. 
Ga. Oct. 17, 2012). 
101 18 U.S.C.S. § 541 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
102 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
103 Violation, United States v. Groeb Farms, Inc., No. 1:13-cr-00139 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 
2013). 
104 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
105 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
106 False Claims Complaint, United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW-Government, Inc., No. 
3:05-cv-00033-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2005). 
107 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
108 Id. 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD109 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
5/30/13 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Customs 
Fraud 
Investigati
ons, LLC 
v. 
Victaulic 
Co.110 
(E.D. Pa. 
2013) 
Failed to 
properly 
mark 
imported iron 
and steel pipe 
fittings with 
country of 
origin, 
thereby 
avoiding 
“marking” 
duties of 
10% of the 
value of 
imports. 
FCA111 1 Civil Pending 
remand 
after Third 
Circuit 
held that 
failure to 
properly 
mark 
imports is 
a false 
claim 
under the 
FCA.112 
Relator is a 
company that 
conducts research 
and analysis on 
potential customs 
fraud. 
35 
6/21/13 
United 
States v. 
Garcia-
Adarme,113 
(D.P.R. 
2013) 
 
 
Avoided anti-
dumping 
duties of 30-
33% and 
countervail-
ing duties of 
374.14% on 
aluminum 
made in 
China by 
“transshipp-
ing” through 
Malaysia. 
Conspiracy,
114 
Smuggling,115 
Wire fraud,116 
Money 
laundering117 
 
2 Criminal 
 
Indictment 
returned 
against 
three 
individuals 
and three 
companies.  
NA 36 
  
 
109 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
110 United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaylic Co., No. 5:13-
cv-02983-MAM (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2013). 
111 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
112 United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co. 839 F.3d 
242 (3d Cir. 2016). 
113 Indictment, United States v. Garcia-Adarme, No. 3:13-cr-00353-FAB (D.P.R. June 
20, 2013). 
114 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
115 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
116 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
117 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD118 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
11/14/13 
United 
States ex 
rel. Valenti 
v. 
Tai Shan 
Golden 
Gain 
Aluminum 
Products 
Ltd., et 
al.,119 
(M.D. Fl. 
2013) 
Avoided 
antidumping 
and 
countervail-
ing duties, by 
falsely 
alleging that 
aluminum 
extrusions 
were from 
Malaysia 
when they 
were in fact 
from China. 
FCA120 2 Civil 
 
Settle-
ments of 
more than 
$4.58 
million: 
Defendant 
Basco 
Mfg, Co. 
settled for 
$1.1 
million; 
defendant 
C.R. 
Laurence 
Co. Inc., 
settled for 
$2,300,000
; defendant 
South-
eastern 
Aluminum 
Products 
settled for 
$650,000; 
and 
defendant 
Waterfall 
Group 
LLC 
settled for 
$100,000.
121 
Relator, 
James F. Valenti, 
received $555,100 
as relator’s share. 
37 
2014        
1/24/14 
United 
States ex 
rel. Estey 
v.  
Tennessee 
Orthopaedi
c Clinics 
PC, et 
al.122 (E.D. 
Tenn. 
2012) 
Misrepresen-
ted country 
of medication 
thereby 
obtaining 
reimburseme
nt from 
Medicare, 
Medicaid and 
other federal 
programs for 
medications 
not approved 
by the FDA.  
FCA123 
 
3 Civil 
 
$1.85 
million 
settlement. 
Relator, Douglas 
Estey, a 
physician’s 
assistant who 
spoke to medical 
providers about the 
product, received 
$323,750 as 
relator’s share. 
38 
  
 
118 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
119 Complaint, United States ex rel. Valenti v. Tai Shan Golden Gain Aluminum Products 
Ltd., No. 3:11-cv-00368-BJD-MCR (M.D. Fl. Oct. 18, 2013). 
120 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
121 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Importers to Pay Over $3 Million to 
Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-importers-pay-over-3-million-settle-false-claims-act  
-suit-alleging-evaded-customs. 
122 Complaint, United States ex rel. Estey v. Tennessee Orthopaedic Clinics, P.C., No. 
3:12-CV-85 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2012). 
123 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD124 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
3/12/14 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Zhonghui 
Tu v. 
Bizlink 
Tech., Inc., 
125 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) 
Understated 
the value of 
goods 
imported 
(used two 
sets of 
invoices; one 
set stated 
actual price 
of goods, the 
other set 
falsely stated 
a lower cost). 
Import duties 
were 
calculated on 
the lower, 
false cost.  
FCA126 1 Civil $1.2 
million 
settlement. 
Relator, 
Zhonghui Tu, a 
former manager of 
the defendant, 
received $252,000 
as relator’s share. 
39 
4/9/14 
United 
States ex 
rel.  
Michael 
Krigstein 
v. Siouni 
& Zar 
Corp., et 
al.127 
(S.D.N.Y. 
2014) 
Understated 
value of 
imported 
apparel to 
avoid 
customs 
duties.  
FCA128 
 
 
1 Civil $10 million 
settlement. 
Relator, Michael 
Krigstein, former 
employee of 
defendant Dana 
Kay Inc., received 
$2.1 million as 
relator’s share. 
40 
4/21/14 
Unites 
States ex 
rel. 
Jimenez v. 
Otter 
Products, 
Inc.,129 (D. 
Colo. 
2014)  
Avoided 
paying 
import duties 
owed by 
understated 
the value of 
product 
imported 
(protective 
cases for 
electronic 
devices). 
FCA,130 
Tariff Act of 
1930131 
1 Civil $4.3 
million 
settlement. 
Relator, Bonnie M. 
Jimenez, former 
employee of 
defendant, 
received 
$830,000 as 
relator’s share. 
41 
  
 
124 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
125 Complaint, United States ex rel. Tu v. Kuo, No. 3:12-cv-04166-WHO (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
8, 2012). 
126 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
127 Complaint, United States ex rel. Krigstein v. Siouni & Zar Corp., No. 1:11-cv-04247-
CM (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013). 
128 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
129 Complaint, United States ex rel. Jimenez v. Otter Products, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-02937-
RM-MJW (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2014). 
130 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
131 19 U.S.C.S. § 1592(c)(4) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD132 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
5/5/14 
United 
States v. 
Nguyen,133  
(E.D. Cal. 
2014) 
Nguyen 
made false 
declarations 
to avoid 
customs 
duties 
(declared 
clothing 
imported 
from China 
as samples 
rather than 
for sale). 
Conspiracy,
134 Mail 
Fraud,135 
Money 
laundering,136  
 
1 and 2 Criminal Sentenced 
to one year 
in prison, 
and 
ordered to 
pay 
$70,000 in 
restitution. 
Forfeiture 
of 
$400,000 
in 
property. 
NA  42 
6/4/14 
United 
States v. 
Santos,137 
(S.D. Tex. 
2014) 
 
Avoided 
paying 
import 
duties, by 
falsely 
stating that 
goods from 
Italy and 
India were 
from Mexico. 
Santos was a 
U.S. Customs 
broker. His 
broker 
responsibilit-
ies involved 
valuing 
shipments for 
importation 
into the U.S.  
and 
submitting 
appropriate 
payments on 
behalf of his 
clients for 
import duties 
due. He 
collected 
correct 
amount from 
his clients, 
and pocked 
the 
difference. 
Entry of 
goods by 
false 
certification,
138 
Smuggling,139 
False 
Statement to 
law 
enforcement
140 
 
1 and 2 Criminal 
 
Sentenced 
to twenty-
eight 
months in 
prison; 
paid 
$140,000 
in 
restitution. 
NA  43 
  
 
132 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
133 Indictment, United States v. Nguyen, No. 1:13-cr-00036-LJO-SKO (E.D. Cal. Jan. 
31, 2013). 
134 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
135 18 U.S.C.S. §1341 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
136 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
137 Indictment, United States v. Santos, No. 5:12-cr-01161 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012). 
138 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
139 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
140 18 U.S.C.S. § 1001 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD141 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
8/19/14 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Simmons 
v. 
Samsung 
Electronics 
America, 
Inc., et 
al.,142  
(D. Md. 
2011) 
Defendants 
falsely 
certified that 
goods sold to 
the U.S. 
government 
were from 
Korea or 
Mexico, both 
of which 
have a 
reciprocal 
trade 
agreements 
with the U.S., 
as required in 
contracts to 
sell goods to 
the federal 
government. 
In fact, the 
goods were 
manufactured 
in China, 
which does 
not have such 
an 
agreement. 
FCA143 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act144 
3 Civil $2.3 
million 
settlement. 
Robert Simmons, 
former Samsung 
employee, 
received $414,000 
relator’s share. 
44 
9/9/14 
United 
States v. 
Sandiford,  
145 (D.N.J. 
2014)  
 
 
Falsified 
which 
Chinese 
factories 
made 
wooden 
bedroom 
furniture, 
thereby 
paying a 
7.24% 
antidumping 
duty instead 
of the 216% 
antidumping 
duty owed. 
Avoided $7 
million in 
duties owed. 
Entry of 
goods by 
means of 
false 
statements146  
2 Criminal 
 
Pled guilty 
to one 
count of 
importing 
merchan-
dise from 
China by 
means of 
false 
statements. 
NA 45 
  
 
141 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime.  
142 Complaint, United States ex rel. Simmons v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 
AW-11-2971 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2011). 
143 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
144 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
145 Complaint, United States v. Sandiford, No. 2:14-cr-00520-WJM (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 
2014). 
146 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD147 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
12/4/14 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
McKinney 
v. DHS 
Technologi
es, LLC,148 
(M.D. Pa. 
2011) 
Falsely 
represented 
the country 
of origin for 
products sold 
to the U.S. so 
as to qualify 
products for 
federal 
contracts.  
FCA,149 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act150 
3 Civil  $1.9 
million.  
Relator, former 
employee of 
defendant, 
received 
approximately 
$361,000 relators 
award. 
46 
2015        
4/2/15 
United 
States ex 
rel Cox et 
al v. 
Medtronic, 
Inc. et 
al.,151 (D. 
Minn.) 
Defendants 
falsely 
claimed that 
goods sold to 
the federal 
government 
(cardiac care 
devices and 
devices used 
in spin 
surgeries) 
were made in 
the U.S. or 
another 
country with 
a reciprocal 
trade 
agreement 
with the U.S., 
when in fact 
the goods 
were made in 
China and 
Malaysia, 
which do not 
have such 
agreements 
with the U.S.  
FCA152 
Trade 
Agreements 
Act153 
3 Civil $4.41 
million 
settlement. 
Three relators, 
former employees 
of defendants, 
share  
$749,700. 
47 
  
 
147 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
148 United States ex rel. McKinney v. DHS Technologies, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-00146-
RDM-MCC (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2011). 
149 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).  
150 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
151 Complaint, United States ex rel. Cox, Medtronic, Inc., No. 0:12-cv-02562-PAM-JSM 
(D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2012). 
152 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
153 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501–81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD154 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
6/1/15 
United 
States v. 
Xilin Chen 
et al155 
(C.D. Cal. 
2015) 
Avoided 
paying 
customs 
duties owed 
by claiming 
merchandise 
imported 
from China 
was worth 
$86,635, 
when the true 
value of the 
clothing was 
$175,535. 
Laundered 
money for 
drug cartel. 
Procured 
citizenship 
by means of 
false 
statements 
(falsely 
declared he 
was not 
involved in 
illegal 
activity). 
Money 
laundering,156 
Presentation 
of false 
immigration 
document157 
1 Criminal Defendant, 
Xilin 
Chen, pled 
guilty to 
three 
felony 
counts 
including 
customs 
fraud, 
conspiracy 
to launder 
money and 
unlawful 
procure-
ment of 
citizenship. 
Sentenced 
to 110 
months in 
prison and 
$2 million 
fine.  
NA 48 
2/12/15 
United 
States ex 
rel. Valenti 
v. Tai 
Shan 
Golden 
Gain 
Aluminum 
Products. 
Ltd.,158 
(M.D. Fl. 
2011) 
Avoided 
antidumping 
and 
countervail-
ing duties, by 
falsely 
alleging that 
aluminum 
extrusions 
were from 
Malaysia 
when they 
were in fact 
from China. 
FCA159 2 Civil 
 
$385,000 
settlement 
(Defendant 
Winfield); 
$50,000 
settlement 
(Defendant 
Ma). 
Relator, James F. 
Valenti Jr., 
received  
$79,000 in 
relator’s share. 
49 
  
 
154 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties, (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
155 United States v. Xilin Chen et al., No. 2:14-cr-00499-PA (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014). 
156 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
157 18 U.S.C.S. § 1546 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
158 Complaint, United States ex rel. Valenti v. Tai Shan Golden Gain Aluminum Products 
Ltd., No. 3:11-cv-00368-BJD-MCR (M.D. Fl. Oct. 18, 2013). 
159 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD160 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
9/8/15 
United 
States v. 
Magness, 
et al.,161 
(W.D.N.Y. 
2015) 
Misrepresen-
ted nature of 
imported 
magnesium 
product to 
qualify for a 
5% duty 
instead of 
applicable  
305% duty.   
Conspiracy to 
smuggle 
merchandise 
into the 
United States 
and 
conspiracy to 
launder 
money162 
2  Criminal Father 
(Gregory 
Magness) 
sentenced 
to eighteen 
months and 
ordered to 
pay 
$6,246,605 
in 
restitution. 
Son (Justin 
Magness) 
sentenced 
to one year 
probation 
and 
ordered to 
pay $4,500 
restitution. 
NA163 50 
10/6/15 
United 
States v. 
Giddens et 
al.,164 
(E.D. TX. 
2014) 
Defendants 
misrepresen-
ted forty-
three 
imported 
shipments of 
prescription 
drugs such as 
Xanax® and 
Valium® as 
“gifts” or 
“toys” to 
reduce duties 
owed. The 
imported 
drugs were 
sub-potent or 
contained 
entirely 
different 
active 
ingredients 
from 
legitimate 
versions. 
Conspiracy165 
Misbranded 
drug 
offenses166 
1 Criminal  Defendants 
Giddens 
and Hollis 
sentenced 
to fifteen 
months in 
prison. 
NA 51 
  
 
160 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
161 Indictment, United States v. Magness, No. 1:10-cr-00125-WMS-JJM (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 
30, 2010). 
162 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
163 Complaint, United States ex rel. Reade Mfg. Co. v. ESM Group, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
00504-WMS (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010). 
164 Indictment, United States v. Giddens, No. 6:14-cr-00061-MHS-JDL (E.D. Tex. Oct. 
24, 2014). 
165 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
166 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 331 (a), 352(a), 352(f)(1), 333(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-
140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD167 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
12/21/15 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
University 
Loft 
Company 
v. 
University 
Furnishing
s, LP,168 
(W.D. Tex. 
2015) 
Avoided anti-
dumping 
duties by 
falsely 
describing 
imported 
furniture 
from China 
as “office 
furniture,” 
which is not 
subject to 
antidumping 
duties, when 
in fact the 
furniture was 
“bedroom 
furniture” 
which was 
subject to 
antidumping 
duties.  
FCA169 2 Civil 
 
$15 million 
settlement. 
Relator, University 
Loft Co, 
competitor of 
defendant, 
received $2.25 
million as relator’s 
share.  
52 
2016        
10/6/15 
United 
States v. 
Giddens et 
al.,170  
(E.D. Tex. 
2014) 
Defendants 
misrepresen-
ted forty-
three 
imported 
shipments of 
prescription 
drugs such as 
Xanax® and 
Valium® as 
“gifts” or 
“toys” to 
reduce duties 
owed. The 
imported 
drugs were 
sub-potent or 
contained 
entirely 
different 
active 
ingredients 
from 
legitimate 
versions. 
Conspiracy171 
Misbranded 
drug 
offenses172 
1 Criminal  Defendant 
Nix 
sentenced 
to fifteen 
months in 
prison. 
 53 
  
 
167 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
168 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Texas-Based Importers Agree to Pay $15 
Million to Settle False Claims Act Suit for Alleged Evasion of Customs Duties (Dec. 21, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-based-importers-agree-pay-15-million-settle   -
false-claims-act-suit-alleged-evasion. 
169 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
170 Indictment, United States v. Giddens, No. 6:14-cr-00061-MHS-JDL (E.D. Tex. Oct. 
24, 2014). 
171 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
172 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 331 (a), 352(a), 352(f)(1), 333(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-
140). 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD173 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
2/22/16 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Graphite 
Electrode 
Sales, Inc. 
v. Ameri-
Source 
Holdings, 
Inc.,174 
(W.D. Pa. 
2016) 
Avoided 
$2,127,420 in 
antidumping 
duties on 
imports of 
graphite 
electrodes 
used in steel 
manufactur-
ing 
from China 
by falsifying 
size of 
electrodes. 
FCA175 
Entry of 
goods by 
false 
documentatio
n176 
 
2 Civil 
 
$3 million 
settlement. 
Relator, Graphite 
Electrode Sales 
Inc., a competitor 
of the defendant, 
received $480,000 
as relator’s share.  
54 
3/28/16 
United 
States ex 
rel. Reade 
Mfg. Co. 
v. ESM 
Group, 
Inc.,177 
(W.D.N.Y. 
2016) 
Conspiracy 
to sell 
defective 
infrared 
counter-
measure 
flares to the 
US 
(magnesium 
in flares 
failed to meet 
specifications
). Also, 
avoided 
antidumping 
duties by 
misrepresent-
ing the nature 
of imported 
magnesium 
product to 
qualify 
imports for a 
5% duty 
instead of 
applicable  
305% duty.   
FCA178 
 
2  Civil 
 
$8 million 
settlement.
179 
Relator, Reade 
Mfg. Co, 
competitor of 
defendant, 
received  
$400,000 as 
relator’s share. 
55 
  
 
173 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
174 Qui Tam Complaint, United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v. Ameri-
source Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013). 
175 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
176 19 U.S.C.S. § 1484 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
177 Jury Trial Demand, United States ex rel. Reade Mfg. Co. v. ESM Group, Inc., No. 
110-cv-00504-WMS (W.D.N.Y June 17, 2010).  
178 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
179 Prior to the civil settlement, five former ESM employees pled guilty to related 
criminal charges, including ESM’s former president, Charles Wright. The criminal 
defendants were ordered to pay more than $14 million in restitution. Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Tennessee and New York-Based Defense Contractors Agree to Pay $8 
Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Involving Defective Countermeasure Flares 
Sold to the U.S. Army (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/tennessee-and-new 
-york-based-defense-contractors-agree-pay-8-million-settle-false-claims-act. See also 
Magness, supra note 140. 
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CASE 
NAME 
ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
STATUTES TYPE 
OF 
FRAUD180 
CIVIL OR 
CRIMINAL 
STATUS RELATOR 
INFORMATION 
CHART 
# 
4/27/16 
United 
States ex 
rel. Wells 
v. Z 
Gallerie, 
LLC,181 
(S.D. Ga. 
2016) 
Avoided 
antidumping 
duties by 
falsely 
describing 
Chinese 
wooden 
bedroom 
furniture 
(which is 
subject to 
antidumping 
duties) as 
“grand 
chests” and 
“hall chests” 
(which are 
not subject to 
antidumping 
duties). 
FCA,182  
Trade 
Facilitation 
and Trade 
Enforcement 
Act183 
2 Civil 
 
$15 million 
settlement. 
Relator, Kelly 
Wells, an e-
commerce retailer 
of furniture, 
received $2.4 
million as relator’s 
award. 
 
56 
9/30/16 
United 
States ex 
rel. 
Bissanti, 
Jr. v. 
Daniel 
Scott 
Goldman 
et al.,184 
(W.D. Tex. 
2016). 
Avoided anti-
dumping 
duties by 
falsely 
describing 
imported 
furniture 
from China 
as “office 
furniture” 
which is not 
subject to 
antidumping 
duties when 
in fact the 
furniture was 
“bedroom 
furniture,” 
which was 
subject to 
antidumping 
duties. 
FCA185 
 
2 Civil $1,525,000 
settlement. 
 
Relator, Matthew 
L. Bissanti, Jr., 
prior employee of 
defendant, 
received $228,750 
relator’s share. 
.  
57 
 
 
180 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2) 
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods 
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57–154 in Trade 
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime. 
181 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California-Based Z Gallerie LLC Agrees to Pay 
$15 Million to Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Apr. 26, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-based-z-gallerie-llc-agrees-pay-15-mil 
lion-settle-false-claims-act-suit-alleging. 
182 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
183 19 U.S.C.S. § 4301 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
184 Complaint, United States ex rel. Bissanti v. Goldman, No. 1:14-cv-00497-SS (W.D. 
Tex. May 29, 2014). 
185 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729–33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
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APPENDIX B: TRADE DATA 
B-1. Antidumping and Countervailing Orders by Product, 2016 
B-2. Antidumping Orders Issued by Country, 2016 
B-3. Antidumping Orders Issued by Country, Comparison, 2005 
and 2015 
B-4. Countervailing Duty Orders Issued by Country, Comparison, 
2005 and 2015 
B-5. Countries Named in Antidumping and Countervailing Orders 
by U.S. 2016 
B-6. Total Combined AD/CVD Orders Per FY 
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APPENDIX B-1 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties by Product, 20161 
 
 
 
Active AD/CVD Orders by Product:  2016 
 
Product Type Number of Orders 
AG (Agriculture and Food) 0 
CH (Chemicals) 1 
ISM (Iron and Steel: Mills) 28 
ISO (Iron and Steel: Other) 0 
ISP (Iron and Steel: Pipe) 6 
MM (Metals and Minerals) 0 
MSC (Miscellaneous Products) 7 
PRSG (Plastic, Rubber, Stone, Glass) 6 
TX (Textiles and Apparel) 0 
ME (Machinery and Electric Equipment) 0 
PSRG (correction by USITC for PRSG 
category) 
0 
 
1 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders Currently in Place, U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations.htm (under 
research tools sidebar click on “AD/CVD Orders”) (last visited on June 2, 2017). 
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APPENDIX B-2 
Antidumping Orders Issued by Country, 20162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Chad P. Brown, Global Antidumping Database, WORLD BANK, http://econ.world 
bank.org/ttbd/gad/ (last visited on May 31, 2017). We used the spreadsheets for each country 
with “detailed data in the database” provided by the Global Antidumping Database 
(supposedly current through 2015) and initiated a search that singled out only the affirmative 
(A) decisions in the F_DUMP_DEC field (there were partial decisions as well however, 
because they were not always affirmative, the info was ambiguous). Then we ordered the 
affirmative decisions chronologically by F_AD_DATE (the date the final AD measure was 
imposed on), counting how many decisions occurred in 2005 and how many occurred in 
2015. 
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APPENDIX B-3 
Antidumping Orders Issued by Country, 
Comparison, 2005 and 20153 
 
Country 
 
Number of AD Orders 
2005 
Number of AD Orders 
2015 
     
Argentina 8 11 
Australia 3 10 
Brazil 3 31 
Canada 4 13 
China 5 16 
European Union 9 19 
India 38 22 
Indonesia 6 2 
Malaysia 5 7 
Mexico 9 7 
Russia 5 2 
South Korea 3 3 
USA 14 18 
 
  
 
3 Id. See text accompanying note 2. 
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APPENDIX B-4 
Countervailing Duty Orders Issued by Country, 
Comparison, 2005 and 20154 
Country Affirmative CVD 
Decisions 2015 
Total Affirmative CVD 
Decisions  
(note varying time 
periods) 
Argentina NA 5 total from 1992-1998 
Australia 2 10 total from 2001-2015 
Brazil NA 10 total from 1991-2008 
Canada 2 33 total from 1985-2015 
Chile NA 2 total in 2000 
China NA 6 total from 2010-2014 
European Union 1 44 from 1977-2015 
Mexico NA 9 total from 1995-2014 
United States 9 216 from 1981-2015 
 
  
 
4 Chad P. Brown, Global Countervailing Duties Database, WORLD BANK, http://econ 
.worldbank.org/ttbd/gcvd/ (last visited May 31, 2017). To gather this data, we used the 
spreadsheets for each country with “detailed data in the database” provided by the Global 
Countervailing Duties Database (listed as current through 2015) and initiated a search that 
singled out only the affirmative (A) decisions in the F_SUB_DEC field (there were partial 
decisions as well however, because they were not always affirmative, the info was 
ambiguous). We ordered the affirmative decisions chronologically by F_CVD_DATE (the 
date the final CVD measure was imposed on), counting how many decisions occurred in 
2005 and how many occurred in 2015. We did not count any decisions where the date was 
missing (where there were no decisions for the year based on our criteria). We listed as 
“NA” where information was unavailable or because it was 0.  
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APPENDIX B-5 
Countries Named in Antidumping and Countervailing Orders by U.S.5 
2016 
Country Number of Orders 
China 9 
India 8 
Korea 7 
Brazil 5 
Turkey 3 
Australia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
U.K. 
2 
 
  
 
5 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders Currently in Place, supra note 1. 
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APPENDIX B-6 
Total Combined AD/CVD Orders Per FY6 
 
 
  
 
6 Id. 
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